IMT Nuremberg Archives

H – 1158

International Court of Justice

H1158-0002

J O D L

DOCUMENT BOOK 7A.

Doc. No.	Exhibit No.	English Transcript Page.	Doc. Bk. Page.	Description.
PS 386.	US 25.	336,735,2137.	1	Notes of conference in the Reichskanzlei on 5 Nov 37.
PS 506.	US 549.	2187.	9	Memorandum dated 22 June 44 initialled "W" re Hitler order of 18 Oct 1942.
PS 508.	US 545.	2182.	10	Reports regarding the landing of British freight gliders in Norway and disposition of crews.
PS 509.	US 547.	2184.	14	Telegram dated 7 Nov 43. Subject British Commando operation in North West.
PS 526.	US 502.	1945,2184.	15	Notice re saboteurs dated 10 May 43.
PS 531.	US 550.	2187.	16	Memorandum dated 23 June 44 signed Warlimont re treatment of Commandos.
PS 551.	US 551.	2189.	18	Teletype 25 June 44 signed Keitel re treatment of Commandos.
PS 865.	US 143.	1196.	20	Decree of the Fuehrer dated 20 April 41 naming Alfred Rosenberg as Commissioner for the Central Control of Questions connected with the East European Region and correspondence relative thereto.
PS 1279.	US 552.	2190.	25	Minutes of a meeting concerning the treatment of members of foreign military missions captured with partisan groups and order dated 7 July 44 pertaining thereto.
PS 2610.	US 548.	2184.	22	Affidavit by Major Roche dated 7th Nov. 1945 giving findings and sentence of a Court Martial on Gen. Dostler.
D 629.	GB 141.	2356.	30	Letter from Keitel to Ribbentrop dated 3 April 40.
D 649.	GB 208.	2706.	31	Affidavit of R.A.L. Hillard dated 28 Dec. 45.
UK 56.	(RF 1439. (RF 335.		33	Order of Jödl 22 Sept. 43.
UK 79.	RF 72.	3039.	34	Preliminary report on German crimes against Norway.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 386-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

NOTES on the Conference in the Reichskanzlei
on 5 Nov 37 from 1615-2030 hours

Present: The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
The Reichsminister for War, Generalfeldmarschall v. BLOMBERG
The C-in-C Army, Generaloberst Freiherr von FRITSCH
The C-in-C Navy, Generaladmiral Dr. H.C. RAEDER
The C-in-C Luftwaffe, Generaloberst GOERING
The Reichsminister for Foreign Affairs Freiherr v. NEURATH
Oberst HOSZBACH

The Fuehrer stated initially that the subject matter of today's conference was of such high importance, that its further detailed discussion would probably take place in Cabinet sessions. However, he, the Fuehrer, had decided NOT to discuss this matter in the larger circle of the Reich Cabinet, because of its importance. His subsequent statements were the result of detailed deliverations and of the experiences of his 4½ years in Government; he desired to explain to the present his fundamental ideas on the possibilities and sighted policy he requested that his statements be looked upon in the case of his death as his last will and testament.

The Fuehrer then stated:

The aim of German policy is the security and the preservation of the nation and its propagation. This is consequently a problem of space.

The German nation disposes of 85 million people, which, because of the number of individuals and the compactness of habitation, form of homogeneous European racial body, which cannot be found in any other country. On the other hand it justifies the demand for larger living space more than for any other nation. If no political body exists in space, corresponding to the German racial body, then that is the consequence of several centuries of historical development, and should this political condition continue to exist, it will represent the greatest danger to the preservation of the German nation (Volkstum) as its present high level. An arrest of the deterioration of the German element in AUSTRIA and in CZECHOSLOVAKIA is just as little possible as the preservation of the present state in GERMANY itself. Instead of growth, sterility will be introduced, and as a consequence, tensions of a social nature will appear after a number of years, because political and philosophical ideas are of a permanent nature only as long as they are able to produce the basis for the realization of the actual claim of existence of a nation. The German future is therefore dependent exclusively on the solution of the need for living space. Such a solution can be sought naturally only for a limited period, about 1-3 generations.

Before touching upon the question of solving the need for living space, it must be decided whether a solution of the German position with a good future can be attained, either by way of an autarchy or by way of an increased share in universal commerce and industry.

Autarchy: Execution will be possible only with strict National-Socialist State policy, which is the basis; assuming this can be achieved the results are as follows:

A. In the sphere of raw materials, only limited, but NOT total autarchy can be attained:

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1. Wherever coal can be used for the extraction of raw materials autarchy is feasible.

2. In the case of ores the position is much more difficult. Requirements in iron and light metals can be covered by ourselves. Copper and tin, however, can NOT.

3. Cellular materials can be covered by ourselves as long as sufficient wood supplies exist. A permanent solution is not possible.

4. Edible fats - possible.

B. In the case of foods, the question of an autarchy must be answered with a definite "NO".

The general increase of living standards, compared with 30 - 40 years ago, brought about a simultaneous increase of the demand an increase of personal consumption even among the producers, the farmers, themselves. The proceeds from the production increase in agriculture have been used for covering the increase in demands, therefore they represent no absolute increase in production. A further increase in production by making greater demands on the soil is not possible because it already shows signs of deterioration due to the use of artificial fertilizers, and it is therefore certain that, even with the greatest possible increase in production, participation in the world market could NOT be avoided.

The considerable expenditure of foreign currency to secure food by import, even in periods when harvests are good, increases catastrophically when the harvest is really poor. The possibility of this catastrophe increases correspondingly to the increase in population, and the annual 560,000 excess in births would bring about an increased consumption in bread, because the child is a greater bread eater than the adult.

Permanently to counter the difficulties of food supplies by lowering the standard of living and by rationalization is impossible in a Continent which had developed an approximately equivalent standard of living. As the solving of the unemployment problem has brought into effect the complete power of consumption, some small corrections in our agricultural home production will be possible, but NOT a wholesale alteration of the standard of food consumption. Consequently autarchy becomes impossible, specifically in the sphere of food supplies as well as generally.

Participation in World Economy. There are limits to this which we are unable to transgress. The market fluctuations would be an obstacle to a secure foundation of the German position; international commercial agreements do NOT offer any guarantee for practical execution. It must be considered on principle that since the World War (1914-18) an industrialization has taken place in countries which formerly exported food. We live in a period of economic empires, in which the tendency to colonize again approaches the condition which originally motivated colonization; in JAPAN and ITALY economic motives are the basis of their will to expand, the economic need will also drive GERMANY to it. Countries outside the great economic empires have special difficulties in expanding economically.

The upward tendency, which has been caused in world economy, due to armament competition, can never form a permanent basis for an economic settlement, and this latter is also hampered by the economic disruption caused by Bolshevism. It is a pronounced military weakness of those States who base their existence on export. As our exports and imports are carried out over those sea lanes which are ruled by BRITAIN, it is more a question of security of transport rather than one of foreign currency, and this explains the great weakness in our food situation in wartime. The only way out, and one which

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may appear imaginary, is the securing of greater living space, an endeavor which at all times has been the cause of the formation of states and of movements of nations. It is explicable that this tendency finds no interest in GENEVA and in satisfied States. Should the security of our food position be our foremost thought, then the space required for this can only be sought in Europe, but we will not copy liberal capitalist policies which rely on exploiting colonies. It is NOT a case of conquering people, but of conquering agriculturally useful space. It would also be more to the purpose to seek raw material producing territory in Europe directly adjoining the Reich and not overseas, and this solution would have to be brought into effect in one or two generations. What would be required at a later date over and above this must be left to subsequent generations. The development of great world-wide national bodies is naturally a slow process and the German people, with its strong racial root, has for this purpose the most favorable foundations in the heart of the European Continent. The history of all times - Roman Empire, British Empire - has proved that every space expansion can only be effected by breaking resistance and taking risks. Even setbacks are unavoidable; neither formerly nor today has space been found without an owner; the attacker always comes up against the proprietor.

The question for GERMANY is where the greatest possible conquest could be made at lowest cost.

German politics must reckon with its two hateful enemies, ENGLAND and FRANCE, to whom a strong German colossus in the centre of EUROPE would be intolerable. Both these states would oppose a further reinforcement of GERMANY, both in EUROPE and overseas, and in this opposition they would have the support of all parties. Both countries would view the building of German military strongpoints overseas as a threat to their overseas communications, as a security measure for German commerce, and retrospectively a strengthening of the German position in Europe.

ENGLAND is NOT in a position to cede any of her colonial possessions to us owing to the resistance which she experiences in the Dominions. After the loss of prestige which ENGLAND HAS suffered owing to the transfer of ABYSSINIA to Italian ownership, a return of EAST AFRICA can no longer be expected. Any resistance on ENGLAND's part would at best consist in the readiness to satisfy our colonial claims by taking away colonies which at the present moment are NOT in British hands, e.g. ANGOLA. French favors would probably be of the same nature.

A serious discussion regarding the return of colonies to us could be considered only at a time when ENGLAND is in a state of emergency and the German Reich is strong and well-armed. The Fuhrer does not share the opinion that the Empire is unshakeable. Resistance against the Empire is to be found less in conquered territories than amongst its competitors. The British Empire and the Roman Empire cannot be compared with one another in regard to durability; since the Punic Wars the latter did not have a serious political enemy. Only the dissolving effects which originated in Christendom, and the signs of age which creep into all states, made it possible for the Ancient Germans to subjugate Ancient ROME.

Alongside the British Empire today a number of States exist which are stronger than it. The British Mother Country is able to defend its colonial possessions only allied with other States and NOT by its own power. How could ENGLAND alone, for example, defend CANADA against an attack by AMERICA or its Far Eastern interests against an attack by JAPAN.

The singling out of the British Crown as the bearer of Empire unity is in itself an admission that the universal empire cannot be maintained permanently by power politics. The following are significant pointers in this respect.

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a) IRELAND's tendency for independence.

b) Constitutional disputes in INDIA where ENGLAND, by her half-measures, left the door open for Indians at a later date to utilize the nonfulfillment of constitutional promises as a weapon against BRITAIN.

c) The weakening of the British position in the FAR EAST by JAPAN.

d) The opposition in the MEDITERRANEAN to Italy which - by virtue of its history, driven by necessity and led by a genius - expands its power position and must consequently infringe British interests to an increasing extent. The outcome of the ABYSSINIAN War is a loss of prestige for Britain which Italy is endeavoring to increase by stirring up discontent in the MOHAMMEDAN world.

It must be established in conclusion that the Empire cannot be held permanently by power politics by 45 million Britons, in spite of all the solidity of her ideals. The proportion of the populations in the Empire, compared with that of the Motherland is 9:1, and it should act as a warning to us that if we expand in space, we must NOT allow the level of our population to become too low.

France's position is more favorable than that of ENGLAND. The French Empire is better placed geographically, the population of its colonial possessions represents a potential military increase. But FRANCE is faced with difficulties of internal politics. At the present time only 10 per cent approximately of the nations have parliamentary governments whereas 90 per cent of them have totalitarian governments. Nevertheless we have to take the following into our political considerations as power factors:

BRITAIN, FRANCE, RUSSIA and the adjoining smaller States.

The German question can be solved only by way of force, and this is never without risk. The battles of FREDERICK THE GREAT for SILECIA, and BISMARCK's wars against AUSTRIA and FRANCE had been a tremendous risk and the speed of PRUSSIAN action in 1870 had prevented AUSTRIA from participating in the war. If we place the decision to apply force with risk at the head of the following expositions, then we are left to reply to the questions "when" and "how". In this regard we have to decide upon three different cases.

Case 1. Period 1943-45. After this we can only expect a change for the worse. The re-arming of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, as well as the formation of the Officers' Corps, are practically concluded. Our material equipment and armaments are modern, with further delay the danger of their becoming out-of-date will increase. In particular the secrecy of "special weapons" cannot always be safeguarded. Enlistment of reserves would be limited to the current recruiting age groups and an addition from older untrained groups would be no longer available.

In comparison with the re-armament, which will have been carried out at that time by the other nations, we shall decrease in relative power. Should we not act until 1943/45, then, dependent on the absence of reserves, any year could bring about the food crisis, for the countering of which we do NOT possess the necessary foreign currency. This must be considered as a "point of weakness in the regime". Over and above that, the world will anticipate our action and will increase counter-measures yearly. Whilst other nations isolate themselves we should be forced on the offensive.

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What the actual position would be in the years 1943-45 no one knows today. It is certain, however, that we can wait no longer.

On the one side the large armed forces, with the necessity for securing their upkeep, the ageing of the Nazi movement and of its leaders, and on the other side the prospect of a lowering of the standard of living and a drop in the birth rate, leaves us no other choice than to act. If the Fuhrer is still living, then it will be his irrevocable decision to solve the German space problem no later than 1943-45. The necessity for action before 1943-45 will come under consideration in cases 2 and 3.

Case 2. Should the social tensions in FRANCE lead to an internal political crisis of such dimensions that it absorbs the French Army and thus renders it incapable for employment in war against GERMANY, then the time for action against CZECHOSLOVAKIA has come.

Case 3. It would be equally possible to act against CZECHOSLOVAKIA if FRANCE should be so tied up by a war against another State, that it cannot "proceed" against Germany.

For the improvement of our military political position it must be our first aim, in every case of entanglement by war, to conquer CZECHOSLOVAKIA and AUSTRIA simultaneously, in order to remove any threat from the flanks in case of a possible advance Westwards. In the case of a conflict with FRANCE it would hardly be necessary to assume that CZECHOSLOVAKIA would declare war on the same day as FRANCE. However, CZECHOSLOVAKIA's desire to participate in the war will increase proportionally to the degree to which we are being weakened. Its actual participation could make itself felt by an attack on SILESIA, either towards the North or the West.

Once CZECHOSLOVAKIA is conquered - and a mutual frontier, GERMANY-HUNGARY is obtained - then a neutral attitude by POLAND in a German-French conflict could more easily be relied upon. Our agreements with POLAND remain valid only as long as GERMANY's strength remains unshakeable; should GERMANY have any setbacks then an attack by POLAND against EAST PRUSSIA, perhaps also against POMERANIA, and SILESIA, must be taken into account.

Assuming a development of the situation, which would lead to a planned attack on our part in the years 1943-45, then the behavior of FRANCE, POLAND and RUSSIA would probably have to be judged in the following manner:

The Fuhrer believes personally that in all probability ENGLAND and perhaps also FRANCE have already silently written off CZECHOSLOVAKIA, and that they have got used to the idea that this question would one day be cleaned up by GERMANY. The difficulties in the British Empire and the prospect of being entangled in another long-drawn-out European War, were decisive factors in the non-participation of ENGLAND in a war against GERMANY. The British attitude would certainly NOT remain without influence on FRANCE's attitude. An attack by FRANCE without British support is hardly probable assuming that its offensive would stagnate along our Western fortifications. Without England's support, it would also NOT be necessary to take into consideration a march by France through Belgium and Holland, and this would also not have to be reckoned with by us in case of a conflict with France, as in every case it would have as consequence the enmity of Great Britain. Naturally, we should in every case have to bar our frontier during the operation of our attacks against CZECHOSLOVAKIA and AUSTRIA. It must be taken into consideration here that Czechoslovakia's defence measures will increase in strength from year to year, and that a consolidation of the inside values of the Austrian army will also be effected in the course of years. Although the population of Czechoslovakia in the first place is not a thin one, the embodiment of Czechoslovakia and Austria would nevertheless constitute the conquest of food for 5-6 million people, on the basis that a compulsory emigration of 2 million from Czechoslovakia and of 1 million

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from Austria could be carried out. The annexation of the two States to Germany militarily and politically would constitute a considerable relief, owing to shorter and better frontiers, the freeing of fighting personnel for other purposes and the possibility of re-constituting new armies up to a strength of about 12 Divisions, representing a new division per 1 million population.

No opposition to the removal of Czechoslovakia is expected on the part of Italy; however, it cannot be judged today what would be her attitude in the Austrian question since it would depend largely on whether the Duce were alive at the time or not.

The measure and speed of our action would decide Poland's attitude. Poland will have little inclination to enter the war against a victorious Germany, with Russia in its rear.

Military participation by Russia must be countered by the speed of our operations; it is a question whether this need be taken into consideration at all in view of Japan's attitude.

Should Case 2 occur - paralyzation of France by a Civil war - then the situation should be utilized at any time for operations against Czechoslovakia, as Germany's most dangerous enemy would be eliminated.

The Fuhrer sees Case 3 looming nearer; it could develop from the existing tensions in the MEDITERRANEAN, and should it occur he has firmly decided to make use of it any time, perhaps even as early as 1938.

Following recent experiences in the course of the events of the war in Spain, the Fuhrer does NOT see an early end to hostilities there. Taking into consideration the time required for past offensives by Franco, a further three years duration of war is within the bounds of possibility. On the other hand, from the German point of view a 100 per cent victory by Franco is not desirable; we are more interested in a continuation of the war and preservation of the tensions in the Mediterranean. Should Franco be in sole possession of the Spanish Peninsula it would mean the end of Italian intervention and the presence of Italy on the Balearic Isles. As our interests are directed towards continuing the war in Spain, it must be the task of our future policy to strengthen Italy in her fight to hold on to the Balearic Isles. However, a solidification of Italian positions on the Balearic Isles can NOT be tolerated either by France or by England and could lead to a war by France and England against Italy, in which case Spain, if entirely in white (i.e. Franco's) hands, could participate on the side of Italy's enemies. A subjugation of Italy in such a war appears very unlikely. Additional raw materials could be brought to Italy via Germany. The Fuhrer believes that Italy's military strategy would be to remain on the defensive against France on the Western frontier and carry out operations against France from Libya against North African French colonial possessions.

As a loading of French-British troops on the Italian coast can be discounted, and as a French offensive via the Alps to Upper Italy would be extremely difficult and would probably stagnate before the strong Italian fortifications, French lines of communication by the Italian fleet will to a great extent paralyze the transport of fighting personnel from North Africa to France, so that at its frontiers with Italy and Germany, France will have at its disposal solely the metropolitan fighting forces.

If Germany profits from this war by disposing of the Czechoslovakian and the Austrian questions, the probability must be assumed that England - being at war with Italy - would not decide to commence operations against Germany. Without British support a warlike action by France against Germany is not to be anticipated.

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The date of our attack on Czechoslovakia and Austria must be made dependent on the course of the Italian-English-French war and would not be simultaneous with the commencement of military agreements with Italy, but of full independence and, by exploiting this unique favorable opportunity he wishes to begin to carry out operations against Czechoslovakia. The attack on Czechoslovakia would have to take place with the "speed of lightning" (blitzartig schnell).

Feldmarshall von Blomberg and Generaloberst von Fritsch in giving their estimate on the situation, repeatedly pointed out that England and France must not appear as our enemies, and they stated that the war with Italy would NOT bind the French army to such an extent that it would NOT be in a position to commence operations on our Western frontier with superior forces. Generaloberst von Fritsch estimated the French forces which would presumably be employed on the Alpine frontier against Italy to be in the region of 20 divisions, so that a strong French superiority would still remain on our Western frontier. The French would, according to German reasoning, attempt to advance into the Rhineland. We should consider the lead which France has got in mobilization, and quite apart from the very small value of our then existing fortifications - which was pointed out particularly by Generalfeldmarschall von Blomberg - the four motorized divisions which had been laid down for the West would be more or less incapable of movement. With regard to our offensive in a South-Easterly direction, Feldmarschall von Blomberg draw special attention to the strength of the Czechoslovakian fortifications, the building of which had assumed the character of a Maginot line and which would present extreme difficulties to our attack.

Generaloberst von Fritsch mentioned that it was the purpose of a study which he had laid on for this winter to investigate the possibilities of carrying out operations against Czechoslovakia with special consideration of the conquest of the Czechoslovakian system of fortifications; the Generaloberst also stated that owing to the prevailing conditions he would have to relinquish his leave abroad, which was to begin on 10 November. This intention was countermanded by the Fuhrer who gave as a reason that the possibility of the conflict was not to be regarded as being so imminent. In reply to the remark by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, that an Italian-English-French conflict be not as near as the Fuhrer appeared to assume, the Fuhrer stated that the date which appeared to him to be a possibility was summer 1938. In reply to statements by Generalfeldmarschall von Blomberg and Generaloberst von Fritsch regarding England and France's attitude, the Fuhrer repeated his previous statements and said that he was convinced of Britain's non-participation and that consequently he did not believe in military action by France against Germany. Should the Mediterranean conflict already mentioned lead to a general mobilization in Europe, then we should have to commence operations against Czechoslovakia immediately. If, however, the powers who are not participating in the war should declare their disinterestedness, then Germany would, for the time being, have to side with this attitude.

In view of the information given by the Fuhrer, Generaloberst Goering considered it imperative to think of a reduction or abandonment of our military undertaking in Spain. The Fuhrer agreed to this in so far as he believed this decision should be postponed for a suitable date.

The second part of the discussion concerned material armament questions.

(Signed) HOSZBACH

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 386-PS

18 November 1945.

I, EVE GLAZIER, P/O, W.R.N.S., 37371, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 386-PS.

EVE GLAZIER
P/O, W.R.N.S.
37371.

H1158 - 0010

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 506-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Draft

WFSt/Qu (Verw. 1)
Nr 006580/44 g.Kdos

Fuehrer Headquarters
22 June 1944

TOP SECRET

2 copies
1st copy

Reference: WR 2 f 10.34 (III/10) Nr 158/44 g.Kdos.-119/44 V-of 17 June 1944

Subject: Enemy agents -
Fuehrer order 003830/42 g. Kdos/OKW/WFSt of 18 October 1942

To
W R

WFSt agrees with the view taken in the letter of the Army group judge (Heeresgruppenrichter) with the Supreme Commander Southwest of 20 May 44 (Br. B. Nr 68/44 g.K.). The Fuehrer order is to be applied even if the enemy employs only one person for a task. Therefore, it does not make any difference if several persons or a single person take part in a commando operation. The reason for the special treatment of participants in a commando operation is that such operations do not correspond to the German concept of usage and customs of (land) warfare.

By direction

initialled: W
(Warlimont)

3 inclosures

. . . . . .

(Translator's note: Following is an attached handwritten note):

Qu 2 W

All questions connected to the commando order (18 Oct 42) are to be handled according to a previous directive of Chef Qu at Qu 2 (W) page 2140, not at administration.

(initial illegible)

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 506-PS

17 October 1945

I, WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE, Lt. (jg) USNR, 391590, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 506-PS.

WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE
Lt (jg) USNR
391590

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 508-PS
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

TOP SECRET

Fuehrer's Headquarters
November 21, 1942

WFSt/Op (L)

5 copies
5th copy

Reference: Landing of British Freight Gliders in Norway. (Illegible signature 2/40/43)

N O T E

Supplement to situation report OKW/WFSt/Op. 21 Nov. 42).

Air Force 5, Ic (G-2) (Capt. S. Lilienskjold) reports 21 Nov. by telephone to inquiry:

1.) Following supplementary report is made about landing of a British freight glider at Hegers and in the night of November 11:

a.) No firing on the part of German defense.

b.) The towing plane (Wellington) has crashed after touching the ground, 7 man crew dead. The attached freight glider also crashed, of the 17-man crew 14 alive. Indisputably a sabotage force. Fuehrer order has been carried out.

2.) In the same night a second freight glider landed East of Stavanger. 3 men of the crew were captured by the Norwegian police on November 21. They state that after it was detached the freight glider made a crash-landing at the Lyse Fjord in the night of Nov. 20; it had a crew of 16. Supposedly several dead and wounded. The landing occurred on the North Shore of the Fjord, opposite the electric plant of Flörly (supplies Stavanger).

The plane has not yet been found. Each and every possible measure to find it and also to seize the other members of the crew has been initiated by the recruiting distruct.

The towing plane has apparently returned to England. The radio communication was monitored by Air Fleet #5.

(Signed: "L")
Went out Nov. 11, 42.

Distribution:

Chief of Operational Staff of the Armed Forces (previous telephone report)
Asst. Chief (Ktb)
Operations (Army)
Operations (Navy)
Operations (Air Force)

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TOP SECRET

F. Amt. Ausl./Abw

Ag Ausl. Nr. 1951/42 gKdos Ausl. Chef

F XVI, E 1/e

Berlin, 4 December, 1942

3 copies
1st copy

To: WFSt

For: Information

From: Abw III.

Subject: Fuehrer order of 18 Oct. 42, about treatment of enemy sabotage troops.

Attached copies of two teletype messages of the Norway Counter Intelligence are hereby forwarded, referring to the order contained in the last paragraph of the 2nd teletype order of the Military Commander of Norway.

It is asked that it should be examined how far this order is compatible with the above discussed Fuehrer order.

By direction
(Illegible signature)

Walimont's initials 8/12

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C O P Y

TOP SECRET

1) Teletype to:

O K W / Abw III F

Subject: Commando Raid.

On November 20, 1942 at 5:50 an enemy plane was found 15 Km NE of Egersund. It is a British aircraft (towed glider) made of wood without engine. Of the 17 member crew 3 are dead, 6 are severly, the others slightly wounded.

All wore English khaki uniforms without sleeve-insignia. Furthermore following items were found: 8 Knapsacks, tents, skis and radio sender, exact number is unknown. The glider carried rifles, light machine guns and machine pistols, number unknown. At present the prisoners are with the Bn. in Egersund.

A second plane has crashed 5 Km East of Helleland. It had a 6 man crew and is supposed to have towed the above glider.

The artillery officer of Stavanger is still at the scene of the incident. Further exact report follows; new annexes attached. The competent Commander's Staff (KDS) was immediately notified on the basis of the Fuehrer order. Foreign agency Norway, Nov. 20, 42, No. 34304/42

TOP SECRET III F

2) Teletype to

OKW/Amt Ausl./Abw III F

Reference: Our No 3/304/42 g.Kdos III F of 20 Nov 42.

Subject: Commando Raid.

Foreign service (AST) reports to above teletype:

Beside the 17 member crew estensive sabotage material and work equipment were found. Therefore the sabotage purpose was absolutely proved. The 280th Inf. Div. (J.D.) ordered the execution of the action according to the Fuehrer's order. The execution was carried out toward the evening of Nov. 20. Some of the prisoners wore blue ski-suits under their khaki uniforms which had no insignia on the sleeves. During a short interrogation the survivors have revealed nothing but their names, ranks and serial numbers.

The salvage of the sabotage material was performed by the Commander's Staff (Kds) of Stavanger. The 2nd aircraft mentioned in the above report is a two-engine plane and was probably the towing plane. It will be inspected. In the same night of the 19th to 20th Nov. a second glider plane was landed at the Lysefjord, 20 Km East of Stavanger, 8 Km East of the Electric plant of Floerly. Until now 3 men, presumably English, were captured by the Norwegian police. The police are on the way to conduct a search for the plane. Supposedly dead and wounded lie around it. According to the statements of the prisoners, this freight glider is supposed to have a 16 man crew. It is possible that this freight glider was towed by the same enemy plane which towed the glider found 15 Km North East of Egersund. The Armed Forces Commander of Norway was notified. Refer at III Wi and Ag WNV/Fu, Oslo.

In connection with the shooting of the 17 members of the crew, the Armed Forces Commander of Norway (WBN) has issued an order to the district commanders, according to which the interrogations by G-2 (Ic) and by BDS are important before the execution of the Fuehrer order; in case of No 4 of the Fuehrer order the prisoners are to be handed out to the BDS.

Foreign agency (Ast) Norway, No. 3/304/42 III F. g.Kdos

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 508-PS

I, WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE, Lt (jg), USNR, 391590, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 508-PS.

WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE
Lt (jg) USNR
391590

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 509-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Telegraph Office: G W N O L

Date: 7 Nov 1943

TOP SECRET

SSD WAQC 0183 7/11 1112 DGZ

To Supreme Command of the Armed Forces/ Wehrmacht Fuehrungsstab/ Room I c

GKDOS (TOP SECRET)

Subject: British Commando - Operation in Northwest

Pescara 2 Nov 43

3 commandos - special treatment

remaining 9 men wounded, in hospital -

OB SUED F.A. ROEM Ic Nr 7595/43 TOP SECRET

- - - - - - -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 509-PS

16 October 1945

I, WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE, Lt (jg) USNR, 391590, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 509-PS.

WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE
Lt (jg) USNR
391590

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H1158 - 0016

Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel
Translation of Document 526-PS

WFSt / Qu (III) 10. 5. 1943

Subject: Saboteurs, Toftefjord. TOP SECRET

NOTICE

On the 30. 3. 1943 in Toftefjord (70° Lat.) an enemy cutter was sighted, cutter was blown up by the enemy. Crew: 2 dead men, 10 prisoners.

Cutter was sent from Scalloway (Shetland Is.) by the Norwegian Navy.

Armament: 2 Colt - MG's, 2 mounted MG's, a small transmitter. In addition there were supposed to have been 4 MG's, 6 submachine guns and 1,000 kg of explosives on board.

Captain of the Cutter: Norwegian, Lt. Eskeland.

Purpose: Construction of an organization for sabotaging of strong-points, battery positions, staff and troop billets and bridges.

Assigner of Mission in London: Norwegian, Maj. Munthe.

Fuehrer order executed by S.D. (security service).

Wehrmacht Report of 6.4 announces the following about it:

In Northern Norway an enemy sabotage-unit was engaged and destroyed on approaching the coast.

- -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 526-PS

16 Oct. 1945

I, WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE, Lt(jg) USNR 391590, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages: and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 526-PS.

WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE
LT(jg) USNR
391590.

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H1158 - 0017

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 531-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Armed Forces Operational Staff
Qm (Adm. 1.)
No. 006688/44 Top Secret

Fuehrer's Hq, 23 June 1944
TOP SECRET
3 copies
1st Copy

H1158-0018

Reference: The Fuehrer's Order No 003832/42/OKW/WFST of 18 Oct 42

Subject: Treatment of Commando-men

Conference Memorandum

Supreme Command West reports by teletype message No 1750/44 Top Secret of 23 June 44:

" The treatment of enemy commando groups has so far been carried out according to the order referred to. With the large-scale landing achieved, a new situation has arisen. The order referred to directs in number 5 that enemy soldiers who are taken prisoner in open combat or surrender within the limits of normal combat operations (large-scale landing operations and undertakings) are not to be treated according to numbers 3 and 4. It must be established in a form easily understood by the troops how far the concept "within the limits of normal combat operations, etc." is to be extended. The view of the Supreme Command West is as follows:

A. The commitment of air-borne troops and commandos effected in Normandy falls clearly under number 5.

B. It is likewise not to be contested that paratroop units or groups set down further to the rear are connected with the large-scale landing operation effected, if they have the mission of breaking supply lines or carrying out deceptive manoeuvers etc. The German combat soldier will not always be able, during battle, to decide whether it is a question of sabotage groups parachuted down or larger air-borne operations in closer or more distant connection with a landing from the sea already carried out or still being carried out.

C. As a result of the large turn-over of troops in the area of the Supreme Command West, especially recently, it is possible that a considerable number of soldiers are ignorant of the order referred to, which dates from more than 1 1/2 years ago. For Germans from foreign countries (Volksdeutsche) and foreign nationalities the differentiation in the treatment of prisoners will hardly be able to be made clear due to language difficulties. A further reproduction of the order in the present situation, where cases of losses must be considered, is held by Supreme Command West to be a false course of action. Considerable reprisals against our own prisoners must be expected if its contents becomes known.

D. The application of number 5 for all enemy soldiers in uniform penetrating from the outside into the occupied western areas is held by Supreme Command West to be the most correct and clearest solution. On the other hand an order of the chief office for Reich security to the commander of the SIPO (Security Police) and the SD (Party Security Service) in Paris has decided that numbers 3 and 4 of the order referred to are to be applied in the future the same as before in the case of uniformed parachutists committed in groups. A conversation with representatives of the higher SS and police fuehrers in France and of the Commander of the SIPO and SD in Paris gave the result that according to the opinion of all concerned the difficulty lies in the determination of the "limits of normal combat operations". As a solution it was agreed to set a line (e.g. Seine from the mouth to Rouen-Argentan-Avranches) North of which number 5, inland of which numbers 3 and 4 apply. This solution also must be called incomplete, since the combat situation can at any time bring the necessity of extending this line to other coastal areas as well. In case of a large-scale aerial landing in the interior such boundaries cannot be drawn anymore at all. Supreme Command West requests, therefore, that, in agreement with the Reichsfuehrer SS, the decision be made, that, in view of the new situation, number 5 is to be applied in the whole occupied western area."

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Position taken by Armed Forces Operational Staff:

1. The Commando order remains basically in effect even after the enemy landing in the west.

2. Number 5 of the order is to be clarified to the effect, that the order is not valid for those enemy soldiers in uniform, who are captured in open combat in the immediate combat area of the beachhead by our troops commited there, or who surrender. Our troops committed in the immediate combat area means the divisions fighting on the front line as well as reserves up to and including corps headquarters.

3. Furthermore, in doubtful cases enemy personnel who have fallen into our hands alive are to be turned over to the SD, upon whom it is encumbent to determine whether the Commando order is to be applied or not.

4. Supreme Command West is to see to it that all units committed in its zone are orally acquainted in a suitable manner with the order concerning the treatment of members of commando undertakings of 18 Oct 42 along with the above explanation.

Proposal:

Attached teletype message.

signed: WARLIMONT

Distribution:

Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces 1 copy
through Deputy Commander of the Armed Forces Operational Staff
Ktb 2 copies
Qu - Draft 3 copies

- - - - - - - -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 531-PS

13 October 1945

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt Inf, O-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 531-PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt Inf
O-1335567

17

H1158 - 0019

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPT
OF DOCUMENT 551-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

WFSt/Qu! (Verw. 1) Chef OKW -(in pencil)
of
(initial) J

26 June 1944
TOP SECRET (Rubber Stamp)
5 copies
1st copy

Checked before Release) in pencil
Chef WFSt)

Remark 1) in pencil
OB. WFSt)

KR - Teletype

To

1.) Supreme Commander West
2.) Chief of Army General Staff
3.) OKL/Lw Fü. Stab
4.) OKM/1.Skl.
5.) Reichsführer SS - Command Staff
6.) Military Commander, France
7.) Military Commander, Belgium/Northern France
8.) Armed forces Commander, Netherlands
9.) OKW/WR
10.) Supreme Commander Southwest (in pencil).

Reference: 1.) Führer Order No. 003830/42 Top Secret of 18 Oct 1942 OKW/WFSt
2.) Teletype Supreme Commander West No. 1750/44 Top Secret of 23 June 1944 (only to OKW/WFSt).

Subject: Treatment of Kommando Participants.

1.) Even after the landing of Anglo-Americans in France, the order of the Führer on the destruction of terror and sabotage units of 18 Oct 1942 remains fully in force.

Enemy soldiers in uniform in the immediate combat area of the bridgehead, that is, in the area of the divisions fighting in the most forward lines as well as of the reserves up to the Corps Commands, according to #5 of the basic order of 18 Oct 1942, remain excempted.

2.) All members of terror and sabotage units, found outside the immediate combat area, who include fundamentally all parachutists, are to be killed in combat. In special cases, they are to be turned over to the SD.

3.) All troops, committed outside the combat area of Normandy, are to be informed about the duty to destroy enemy terror and sabotage units briefly and succinctly according to the directives, issued for it.

4.) Supreme Commander West will report immediately daily, how many saboteurs have been liquidated in this manner. This applies especially also to undertakings by the military commanders. The number is to be published daily in the Armed Forces communique to exercise a frightening effect, as has already been done toward previous Kommando undertakings in the same manner.

(Initial) W (Warlimont)

- -

18

H1158 - 0020

(signature) Keitel

OKW/WFSt/Qu. (Verw.1)
Nr. 006688/44 Top Secret

Addition for Supreme Commander Southwest)
Similar action is to be taken in the Italian) (Written by hand).
theater of war.)

(initial) J (Jodl)

After forwarding:

Qu (Verw.1) Simultaneously teletype	1st copy.
Op (H)	2nd copy.
Op (M)/ (L) / Ktb.	3rd copy.
VO Foreign	4th copy.
VO W Pr	5th copy.

Copy was sent on 18 Aug to the Chief of the Security Police and the SD.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPT OF
DOCUMENT 551-PS

7 November 1945

I, WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE, Lt (jg) USNR, 391590, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of Excerpt from Document No. 551-PS.

WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE
Lt (jg) USNR
391590.

19

H1158 - 0021

H1158 - 0022

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 865-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

I name Reichsleiter Alfred R o s e n b e r g as my Commissioner for the central control of questions connected with the East-European Region.

An office, which is to be established in accordance with his orders, is at the disposal of Reichsleiter Rosenberg for the carrying out of the duties thereby ertrusted to him.

The necessary money for this office is to be taken out of the Reich Chancellory Treasury in a lump sum.

Fuehrer's Headquarters 20th April 1941.

The Fuehrer
signed Adolf Hitler.

Reich Minister and Head of Reich Chancellory
signed Dr. Lammers.

The Reich Minister and the Head of the
Reich Chancellory

Berlin W8 21st April
1941
Vossstrasse 6
At present Fuehrer
Headquarters, mail
without exception to
be sent to the Berlin
address.

To:
The Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces.
General Field Marshal Keitel .

TOP SECRET

Personal. By curier.

My dear General Field Marshal.

Herewith I am sending you a copy of the Fuehrer's Decree by which the Fuehrer appointed Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg as his Commissioner for the central control connected with the East European Region. In this capacity Reichsleiter Rosenberg is to make the necessary preparations for the probable emergency with all speed. The Fuehrer wishes that Rosenberg shall be authorized for this purpose to obtain the closest coopration of the highest Reich authorities, receive information from them, and summon the representatives of the Highest Reich Authorities ... to conferences. In order to guarantee the necessary secrecy of the commission and the measures to be undertaken, for the time being only those of the highest Reich Authorities should be informed, on whose co-operation Reichsleiter Rosenberg will primarily depend. There are: the Commissioner for the Four Year plan, the Reich Minister of Economies and you yourself.

Therefore may I ask you, in accordance with the Fuehrer's wishes, to place your co-operation at the disposal of Reichsleiter Rosenberg, in the carrying out of the task imposed upon him.

It is recommended in the interests of secrecy, that you name a representative in your office, with whom the office of the Reichsleiter can communicate and who in addition to your usual reputy should be the only one to whom you should communicate the contents of this letter.

I should be obliged if you would acknowledge the receipt of this letter.

Heil Hitler, Yours very sincerely
Dr. Lammers.

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H1158 - 0023

The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. 25. April 1941.

Most Secret.
By curier.

To:
The Head of the Reich Chancellory,
Reich Minister Dr. Lammers.

Personal.

Dear Reich Minister.

I acknowledge receipt of the copy of the Fuehrer's Decree in which the Fuehrer appointed Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg as his Commissioner for the central control of questions connected with the East European Region. I have named General of the Artillery Jodl, Head of the Armed Forces Operational Staff as my permanent Deputy and Major General Warlimont as his Deputy.

Heil Hitler.
Yours very sincerely
K.
25/4.

The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. 25th April 1941.

Most Secret.
By curier.

To:
Reichsleiter Rosenberg.
Personal.

Dear Reichsleiter,

The Head of the Reich Chancellory has sent me a copy of the Fuehrer's Decree, by which he has appointed you his Commissioner for the central control of questions connected with the East European Region. I have charged General of the Artillery Jodl, Head of the Armed Forces Operational Staff and his Deputy, Major General Warlimont with the solving of these questions, as far as they concern the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. Now I ask you, as far as your Office is concerned, to deal with him only.

Heil Hitler,
Yours very sincerely
K. 25/4.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 865-PS

November 23, 1945.

I, EVE GLAZIER, P/O, W.R.N.S., 37371, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 865-PS.

21

EVE GLAZIER, P/O, W.R.N.S., 37371.

2610 P.S

NURNBERG, GERMANY. } SS

FREDERICK W. ROCHE being duly sworn deposes and says:

I am a Major in the Army of the United States.

I was the Judge Advocate of the Military Commission which tried Anton Dostler for ordering the execution of the group of fifteen United States Army personnel who comprised the "Ginny Mission". This Military Commission consisting of five officers was appointed by command of General McNarney, by Special Orders No. 269, dated 26 September 1945, Headquarters, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, United States Army, APO 512.

The Military Commission met at Rome, Italy, on 8 October 1945 and proceeded with the trial of the case of the United States v. Anton Dostler. The trial of this case consumed four days and the findings and sentence were announced on the morning of 12 October 1945. The charge and specification in this case are as follows:

"Charge: Violation of the law of war.
Specification: In that Anton Dostler, then General, commanding military forces of the German Reich, a belligerent enemy nation, to wit the 75th Army Corps, did, on or about 24 March 1944, in the vicinity of La Spezia, Italy, contrary to the law of war, order to be shot summarily, a group of United States Army personnel consisting of two officers and thirteen enlisted men who had then recently been captured by forces under General Dostler, which order was carried into execution on or about 26 March 1944, resulting in the death of the said fifteen members of the Army of the United States identified as follows:

First Lieutenant Vincent Russo, 01109637
First Lieutenant Paul J. Traficante, 01308399
Technical Sergeant Livio Viecelli, 33037797
Sergeant Alfred L. DeFlumeri, 31252071
Sergeant Dominic C. Mauro, 32650582
Technician Fifth Grade Liberty J. Tremonte, 31329179
Technician Fifth Grade Joseph M. Farrell, 31329187
Technician Fifth Grade Salvatore DiSclafani, 32297264

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Technician Fifth Grade Angelo Sirico, 32542008
Technician Fifth Grade John J. Leone, 32577443
Technician Fifth Grade Thomas N. Savino, 32540701
Technician Fifth Grade Joseph A. Libardi, 31212732
Technician Fifth Grade Joseph Noia, 32536119
Technician Fifth Grade Rosario V. Squatrito, 32542038
Technician Fifth Grade Santaro Calcara, 36131251".

I was present throughout the entire proceeding, I heard all the testimony, and I am familiar with the record in this case. The facts developed in this proceeding are as follows: On the night of 22 March 1944, two officers and thirteen enlisted men of the 2677th Special Reconnaissance Battalion of the Army of the United States disembarked from some United States Navy boats and landed on the Italian coast near Stazione di Framura. All fifteen men were members of the Army of the United States and were in the military service of the United States. When they landed on the Italian coast they were all properly dressed in the field uniform of the United States Army and they carried no civilian clothes. Their mission was to demolish a railroad tunnel on the main line between La Spezia and Genoa. That rail line was being used by the German Forces to supply their fighting forces on the Cassino and Anzio Beachhead fronts. The entire group was captured on the morning of 24 March 1944 by a patrol consisting of Fascist soldiers and a group of members of the German Army. All fifteen men were placed under interrogation in La Spezia and they were held in custody until the morning of 26 March 1944 when they were all executed by a firing squad. These men were never tried nor were they brought before any court or given any hearing; they were shot by order of Anton Dostler, then General Commanding the 75th German Army Corps.

Anton Dostler took the stand in this case and testified by way of defense that he ordered the fifteen American soldiers to be shot pursuant to

the Hitler order of 18 October 1942 on commando operations, which provided that commandos were to be shot and not taken prisoners of war, even after they had been interrogated. He also testified that he would have been subject to court martial proceedings if he did not obey the Hitler order.

The following is a true copy of the findings and sentence in the case of the United States v. Anton Dostler, as these findings and sentence appear in the original record of the trial and as they were announced in open court at Rome, Italy on 12 October 1945:

"FINDINGS: General Dostler, as president of this commission it is my duty to inform you that this commission in closed session and upon secret written ballot, at least two-thirds of all of the members of the commission concurring in each finding of guilty, finds you of the specification and of the charge:

GUILTY.

SENTENCE: And again in closed session and upon secret written ballot, at least two-thirds of all of the members of the commission concurring, sentences you:

TO BE SHOT TO DEATH BY MUSKETRY."

Frederick W. Roche
FREDERICK W. ROCHE,
Major, J.A.G.D.

Sworn to and subscribed
before me, this the 7th
day of November, 1945.

Teddy W. Hollers.
TEDDY W. HOLLERS,
Colonel, J.A.G.D.

24

H1158 - 0026

H1158 - 0027

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1279-PS

Ops. Staff of the Armed Forces/Qu (Admin. 1)
No. 007893/44 Top Secret
(The number is changed, in pencil, to 009074/44)

Pencil note: One copy has been destroyed in accordance with agreement on destruction.

22. 7. 1944 (Initials) 27/7

Top Secret Pencil note: Admin 1 D 25/7

2 Copies
2nd Copy

In green pencil: Qu, 1. Bem, initialled Warlimont 25/7

Subject: Treatment of members of foreign "military missions" captured with partisan groups.

MEMORANDUM

1). The Führer has stated that members of Anglo-American and Soviet-Russian so-called "military missions", captured in the partisan fighting in the South-East, are to be treated in the same way as those taking part in a commando operation and not as prisoners of war.

2). Independently of the above, the Ag. Ausl. foreign countries Agency, following queries made by the RSHA. - Military Bureau - has put forward for decision the question of how British and American soldiers captured with the partisan groups are to be treated.

The following opinions are available in this connection:

a). C-in-C, South-East

The members of allied military missions are to be handed over to the SD, should the following view (b) be inapplicable.

N.B. Armed Forces Ops Staff Op (Army is crossed out in green pencil. Marginal note in black pencil: see document 2235)

b). Supreme Command of the Armed Forces/Prisoners of war general section in conjunction with the Supreme Command of the Army/Army General Staff/Alient Armies in the West and Armed Forces Ops Staff/Op. (Army).

Treatment as Prisoners of war in accordance with Order: Armed Forces Ops Staff/Op (Army) No. 03408/43 Secret, dated 18.8.43.

N.B. Armed Foces Ops Staff/Org. Is crossed out in green pencil. Marginal note: in black pencil: see document 2235)

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces/Chief of Prisoners of War Matters in conjunction with Armed Forces Legal Dept (WR) and Armed Forces Ops Staff/Org.

Treatment as prisoners of war in accordance with Order: Armed Forces Ops Staff/Org II No. 02958/43 Secret, dated 8.7.43, which disregards differences of nationality. The only exception made is in the case of commando operations. (then they are handed over to the Security Service (SD).

d). RSHA/Section IV

Fundamentally treatment as prisoners of war on the basis of the directives given in b) and c), but a more definite ruling is required as to whether and in what circumstances they are to be handed over to the Security Service (SD.)

(7535)

25

H1158 - 0028

e). RSHA/Military Bureau

Considers that the Commando Order cannot be applied to partisan fighting in the South East, and that to do so would also be dangerous, in that it might imperil those taking part in our own operations (Brandenburg).

f). No opinion on the question of foreign missions.

f). Ag. Ausl. (Foreign Countries Agency):

Fundamentally, treatment as prisoners of war, unless members of the missions were taking part in a commando operation.

g). Armed Forces Ops Staff/Op. (Army)

(N.B. The whole of g is crossed out)

Treatment as the members of partisan groups themselves, i.e. as prisoners of war if they are in uniform and are captured or surrender in open battle; to be killed if they are in civilian clothes or are captured in a sabotage or commando operation.

3). Opinion and proposal of the Armed Forces Ops Staff:

According to the orders issued to date, even the British captured in the "Rösselsprung" operation, for example must be treated as prisoners of war. This is especially evident from the Op. (Army)- Order dated 18.8.43.

(N.B. this last sentence is put in parenthesis in red, underlined Op (Army) crossed out in green and a large green question mark inserted in the margin).

The Commando-Order has never yet been applied to such missions and its extension to cover them has not yet been ordered. If the missions are to be treated otherwise than in accordance with the orders to date, it must first be decided whether a foreign mission acting with the partisan groups in the South-East is to be called a command operation and treated as such. Such a decision is considered to be indicated, even if it would not correspond completely to the wording of the commando Order or to the existing definition of a commando operation (as particularly underhand and so far not customary form of warfare which must be combatted with appropriate counter-measures). The fundamental principle to be adopted is what all members of partisan groups, in the South-East too, are fundamentally guerrillas. They are in fact treated as prisoners of war for reasons of expediency in order to obtain the largest posible number of deserters and workers. There are no grounds for this with regard to the members of foreign missions who are not numerous It is therefore not necessary to treat them in every case in the same way as the members of partisan groups themselves. Basically both Anglo-American and Soviet-Russian military missions can, on the contrary, be considered as commando operations and their members treated accordingly.

The appended Order is therefore proposed.

(Initialled by Warlimont)

H1158 - 0029

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1279-PS
(Cont)

Ops Staff of the Armed Forces/Qu (Admin. 1) 27. 7. 1944
No. 009074/44 Top Secret

Most Secret

2 Copies
1st Copy

Subject: Treatment of members of foreign "military missions" captured with partisan groups.

K (initialled in pencil by Keitel)

MEMORANDUM

1). The Führer has stated that members of Anglo-American and Soviet-Russian so-called "military missions", captured in the partisan fighting in the South-East, are to be treated in the same way as those taking part in a commando operation and not as prisoners of war.

2). Independently of the above, the Ag. Ausl. (Foreign Countries Agency) following queries made by the RSHA - Military Bureau -, has put forward for decision the question of how British and American soldiers, captured with the partisan groups, are to be treated.

The following opinions are available in this connection:

a). C-in-C, South East

The members of allied military missions are to be handed over to the SD, should the following view (b) be inapplicable.

b). Supreme Command of the Armed Forces/Prisoners of War General Section in conjunction with Supreme Command of the Army/Army General Staff/Alien Armies in the West:

Treatment as prisoners of war in accordance with Order Supreme Command of the Armed Forces/Armed Forces Ops Staff/Op. (Army) No. 03408/43 Secret, dated 18.8.43.

c). Supreme Command of the Armed Forces/Chief of Prisoners of War Matters in conjunction with Armed Forces Legal Dept (WR):

Treatment as prisoners of war in accordance with Order: Armed Forces Ops Staff/Org II No. 02958/43 Secret, dated 8.7.43 which disregards differences of nationality. The only exception made is in the case of commando operations (then they are handed over to the Security Service (SD).

d). RSHA/Section IV

Fundamentally treatment as prisoners of war on the basis of directives given in b) and c), but a more definite ruling is required as to whether, and in what circumstances, they are to be handed over to the Security Service (SD).

e). RSHA/Military Bureau:

Considers that the Commando Order cannot be applied to partisan fighting in the South East and that to do so would also be dangerous in that it might imperil those taking part in our own operations (Brandenburg).

No opinion on the question of Foreign Missions.

(7537)

27

H1158 - 0030

f). Ag. Ausl. (Foreign Countries Agency)

Fundamentally treatment as prisoners of war, unless members of the mission were taking part in a commando operation.

3). Opinion and proposal of the Armed Forces Ops Staff

According to the Orders issued to date, even, the British captured in the "Rosselsprung" operation for example must be treated as prisoners of war.

The Commando Order has never yet been applied to such missions, and its extension to cover them has not yet been ordered. If the missions are to be treated otherwise than in accordance with the orders to date, it must first be decided whether a foreign mission acting with the partisan groups in the South East is to be called a commando operation and treated as such. Such a decision is considered to be indicated even if it would not correspond completely to the wording of the commando order or to the existing definition of a commando operation (as particulary underhand and so far not customary form of warfare which must be combatted with appropriate counter measures). The fundamental principle to be adopted is that all members of partisan groups, in the South East too are fundamentally guerrillas. They are in fact treated as prisoners of war, for reasons of expediency, in order to obtain the largest possible number of deserters and workers. There are no grounds for this with regards to the members of foreign missions who are not numerous. It is therefore not necessary to treat them in every case in the same way as the members of partisan groups themselves. Basically, both Anglo-American and Soviet-Russian military can, on the contrary be considered as commando operations and their members treated accordingly.

The appended Order is therefore proposed.

sgd. Warlimont

Distribution:

Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
via the Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Ops Staff. 1st Copy

Qu. (Draft) 2nd Copy

(The second copy of the above dated 27.7.1944 marked "Draft" is also contained in 1279-PS it is initialled at the end by Warlimont and has an illegible pencil note at the top. In the second copy the first words of 2) and of 3) are underlined in pencil. The typescript of both copies is identical).

H1158 - 0031

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1279-PS
(cont.)

Draft

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
No. 007893/4 Most Secret/Armed Forces Ops Staff/QU (Admin. 1)

(The number is changed to 009074/44) Führer Headquarters 22. 7. 1944

Most Secret

... Copies
. Copy

Subject: Treatment of members of foreign "military missions" captured with partisan groups.

The Special Orders for the treatment of captured members of partisan groups do not apply to members of foreign so-called "military mission" (Anglo-American or Soviet-Russian) captured in the fight against partisan groups in the areas under the command of the C-in-C South East and South West. They are therefore to be treated, not as prisoners of war, but in accordance with the Führer's Order on the extermination of terrorist and sabotage troops, dated 18.10.1942 (OKW/WFSt No. 003830/42 Most Secret).

This order is not to be distributed beyond the divisional or equal-ranking staffs of the other branches of the Armed Forces. Any papers distributed to Army Headquarters and equal-ranking staffs, of the Armed Forces are to be recalled, when read, and destroyed.

(This last sentence is changed to "This order is not to be distributed beyond General Headquarters and equal-ranking staffs of other branches of the Armed Forces and is to be destroyed when read.").

Distribution:

C-in-C South East	Copy 1
C-in-C South West	Copy 2
Army General Staff	Copy 3
OKM/Naval War Staff	Copy 4
OKL/Air Force Ops Staff	Copy 5
Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police Headquarters Staff of the Reichsführer SS - for the attention of SS Brigadeführer and Major-General of the Waffen SS Rohde, also for RSHA	Copy 6
OKW/Gen. Armed Forces Dept.	Copy 7
/Chief of P.W. section	Copy 8
/Armed Forces Reserves (WR)	Copy 9
/WFSt/W Pr	Copy 10
/Op (Army-Air Force-Navy)	Copy 11
/Org	Copy 12
/War Diary	Copy 13
/Qu (Draft)	Copy 14
Reserve	Copy 15 - 25

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 1279-PS

28th May 1946

I, Leslie A. Hill. M.C. Major, Northumberland Hussars, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 1279-PS.

LESLIE A. HILL. M.C.
Major, Northumberland Hussars
217840

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D/629

SECRET COMMAND MATTER

THE CHIEF

OF THE HIGHER COMMAND OF THE WEHRMACHT

WFA/Dept. L No. 22126 /40 g.k. (IV)

Berlin W 35,
Tirpitzufer 72-76,

3rd April, 1940

2 copies
2nd copy

To the
Reichs Minister for Foreign Affairs

Dear Herr von Ribbentrop,

The military occupation of Denmark and Norway has been, by command of the Führer, long in preparation by the High Command of the Wehrmacht. The High Command of the Wehrmacht has therefore had ample time to occupy itself with all the questions connected with the carrying out of this operation. The time at your disposal for the political preparation of this operation is on the contrary very much shorter. I believe myself therefore to be acting in accordance with your own ideas in transmitting to you herewith, not only those wishes of the Wehrmacht which would have to be fulfilled by the Governments in Oslo, Copenhagen and Stockholm for purely military reasons, but also if I include a series of requests, which certainly concern the Wehrmacht only indirectly, but which are however of the greatest importance for the fulfillment of its task.

I would request, in order to bring about complete agreement of action, that personal contact between the German Plenipotentiaries and the military Commanders appointed for Oslo and Copenhagen should be established as soon as possible. The entire direction of the military operation is in the hands of Inf. General v. Falkenhorst, Commander of group XXI. Under him, the occupation of Denmark will be directed by the High Command for special operations XXXI, C. in C. Air Force Kaupisch.

In accordance with the Führer's specific instructions, may I furthermore request, that the number of persons participating in the preparations be restricted to the utmost. Apart from the Foreign Office and the High Command of the Wehrmacht, other higher Reich authorities and similar offices are not in principle participating. The necessary instructions to the Higher Reich Authorities will only be given on the day of occupation itself by the High Command of the Wehrmacht.

Heil Hitler,

Yours faithfully,

K. 3/4

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A F F I D A V I T

I, RICHARD ARTHUR LOPAINE HILLARD, Barrister-at-Law, make oath and say as follows:-

1. I was the Judge Advocate at the trial of Obersturmbannfuhrer Hans Wilhelm BLOMBERG, Obersturmbannfuhrer Hans KELLER, Obersturmfuhrer Georg Ludwig Werner OPPEL, Understurmfuhrer Alfred KREUTZ, Obersturmfuhrer Erwin LANG, Rudolf Hermann Theodor KAPP, Willi Friedrick Reinhold TIEGE, Oberscharfuhrer George EBERL, Hauptscharfuhrer Friedrich Wilhelm EISENACHER, Obersturmfuhrer George MULLER, and Oberscharfuhrer SCHMIDT, by a Military Court held at the Law Courts, Oslo, Norway, which sat on Thursday, 29th November 1945 and concluded its sittings on Tuesday, 4th December, 1945.

2. The Court was convened by order of Major-General D.A.H.Graham, CB, CBE, DSO, MC, Commander, British Land Forces, Norway, and the President of the Court was Major-General C.H.Miller, CB, CBE, DSO. The prosecution was conducted by Major E.Steel, Legal Staff Officer, Deputy Judge Advocate General's Office, Oslo, and the accused were defended by a serving British officer.

3. The accused were charged with Committing a War Crime, in that they at Ulven, Norway, in or about the month of July, 1943, in violation of the laws and usages of war, were concerned in the killing of Lt. A.H.Andresen, Petty Officer B.Kleppe, Leading Stoker A.Bigseth, Able Seaman J.Klipper, Able Seaman G.B.Hansen, and Able Seaman K.Hals, Royal Norwegian Navy, and Leading Telegraphist R. Hull, Royal Navy, prisoners of war.

4. There was evidence before the Court which was notchallenged by the Defence that Motor Torpedo Boat No. 345 set out from Lerwick in the Shetlands on a naval operation for the purpose of making torpedo attacks on German shipping off the Norwegian coast, and for the purpose of laying mines in the same area. The persons mentioned in the charge were all the crew of the Torpedo Boat.

5. The defence did not challenge that each member of the crew was wearing uniform at the time of capture and there was abundant evidence from many persons, several of whom were German, that they were wearing uniform at all times after their capture.

6. On 27th July, 1943, the Torpedo Boat reached the island of Aspo off the Norwegian coast, north of Bergen. On the following day the whole of the crew were captured and were taken on board a German naval vessel which was under the command of Admiral von Schrader, the Admiral of the west coast. The crew were taken to the Bergenhus where they had arrived by 11 p.m. on 28th July. The crew were there interrogated by Leut H.P.K.W.Fanger, a Naval Leutnant of the Reserve, on the orders of Korvettenkapitan Egon Drascher, both of the German Naval Intelligence Service. This interrogation was carried out upon the orders of the staff of the Admiral of the West Coast. Leut. Fanger reported to the Officer in charge of the Intelligence Branch at Bergen that in his opinion all the members of the crew were entitled to be treated as prisoners-of-war, and that officer in turn reported both orally and in writing to the Sea Commander, Bergen, and in writing to the Admiral of the west coast.

7.The interrogation by the Naval Intelligence Branch was concluded in the early hours of 29th July, and almost immediately all the members of the crew were handed over on the immediate orders of the Sea Commander, Bergen, to Obersturmbannfuhrer of the SD. Hans Wilhelm Blomberg, who was at that
3855) time Kommandeur of the Sicherheitspolizei at Bergen. This followed a

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meeting between Blomberg and Admiral von Schrader, at which a copy of the Fuhrer order of the 18th October, 1942, was shown to Blomberg. This order dealt with the classes of persons who were to be excluded from the protection of the Geneva Convention and were not to be treated as prisoners-of-war, but when captured were to be handed over to the SD. Admiral von Schrader told Blomberg that the crew of this Torpedo Boat were to be handed over in accordance with the Fuhrer order, to the SD.

9. The SD then conducted their own interrogation which lasted the greater part of the 29th July. The official of the SD who carried out this interrogation stated at the trial that after the interrogation he was of the opinion that the members of the crew were entitled to be treated as prisoners-of-war, and that he so informed his superior officer. Despite this report and the representations of a superior officer, the crew were dealt with under the Fuhrer order and were executed. The execution was carried out early the next morning, each of the members of the crew being taken to a rifle range adjoining a concentration camp and there shot, one by one, by an execution squad composed of members of the SD.

10. Orders were asked for as to how the bodies should be disposed of, and the officer in charge of the execution party was ordered to dispose of the bodies secretly "in the usual way". He accordingly carried out this order by attaching a charge to each body and exploding it when the body was in the water.

11. It appeared from the evidence that in March or April, 1945, an order from the Fuhrer Headquarters, signed by Keitel, was transmitted to the German authorities in Norway. The substance of the order was that members of the crew of commando raids who fell into German captivity were from that date to be treated as ordinary prisoners-of-war. This order referred specifically to the Fuhrer order referred to above.

SWORN by the said RICHARD ARTHUP)
LORAINE HILLARD at 6 Spring Gardens) (signed) R. A. L. HILLARD.
in the City of Westminster this)
28th day of December, 1945,)

Before me

(signed) C. BUCKLEY.
A Commissioner for Oaths.

3856)

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U.K.56

TELEGRAM (Not in Code)

OKW 22-9-43. 19.20 hours.
Rec'd. 22-9-43. 21.20 hours.

No Reference No, 22.9. Secret Command Document.

Top Secret - Only through an Officer.

Foreign Officer, for Ambassador Ritter.

for information of Reichsfuehrer - SS & Chief of German Police, SS Command Staff Hochwald.

+

for information of Chief of Army Munitions & BDE

Similarly C in C German Troops in Denmark.

The Fuehrer has ordered;

1. Reichsfuehrer SS has permission to recruit from the former members of the Danish Forces who are about to be released, and to send up to 4,000 men of the youngest classes to an SS Camp in the Reich.

2. The deportation of the Jews will be carried out by the Reichsfuehrer SS, who for this object will move 2 Police Battalions to Denmark.

3. The military state of emergency is to remain in force at least until the conclusion of the actions ordered in paras. 1 and 2. A special order will be issued regarding its cancellation.

4. The German Plenpotentiary has been similarly informed by the Foreign Office.

I.A.

(Signed) JODL.

OKW/WFST/QU.2 (N)
No. 66 23 33/43 E Kdos Chevs.

This is copy No. 5.

+ Chef H. Ruest.

Serial 55 No. 37217.

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PRELIMINARY

REPORT

ON

GERMANY'S CRIMES AGAINST NORWAY

OSLO 1945

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PRELIMINARY REPORT

ON

GERMANY'S CRIMES AGAINST NORWAY

PREPARED BY

THE ROYAL NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT

FOR USE AT

THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL

IN TRIALS AGAINST THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS
OF THE EUROPEAN AXIS

BY

MAJOR FINN PALMSTRØM

Deputy Norwegian Representative on the United Nations' War Crimes Commission

AND

ROLF NORMANN TORGERSEN

Secretary in the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Police.

OSLO 1945

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FOREWORD

by

JOHAN CAPPELEN

Norwegian Minister of Justice and Police.

The Royal Norwegian Government herewith submits to the International Military Tribunal, a report on Germany's crimes against Norway, for use in the forthcoming trials of the German war criminals who bear the main responsibility for Germany's policy of aggression, war and occupation.

The report has been designated as "preliminary" because all the details have not yet been fully clarified and because all the evidence has not been uncovered. Consequently, the report gives only a preliminary survey and mentions only selected examples under the different headings.

Norway was one of the first countries to be attacked by the German military forces, and has therefore suffered longest from the German terror and the Nazi methods of violence. However, the Nazis were unable to break the spirit of the Norwegian people, in spite of the fact that thousands of Norway's best men and women were executed, imprisoned, deported and subjected to torture, and in spite of the fact that Norwegian property was plundered and destroyed.

By adherence to the St. James Declaration and the Moscow Declaration, the Royal Norwegian Government has indicated its desire that the responsible war criminals be indicted, tried and punished for the illegal and unlawful acts which they have committed. The Royal Norwegian Government wishes therefore, by means of this report, to give preliminary documentary evidence of the criminal acts affecting Norway.

Johan Cappelen
(sign.)

Oslo, 1st October 1945.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Norway has in many respects suffered less from the war than most of the other German-occupied countries in Europe. Broadly speaking the country as a whole has been saved from becoming a battle-field and has been spared the total destruction which this involves, although the war operations in 1940 and the German "scorched earth" policy in the northernmost district of Finnmark and Troms in November, 1944, did great damage to the country. Both by and large as in relation to the size of the population, the number of deaths caused by the war and the occupation is not high in comparison with the losses in many of the other countries. The number of prisoners and deportees is, to be sure, large from a Norwegian point of view, but can hardly be compared with the figures for, for instance, Poland, Jugoslavia, France or the Netherlands.

Nevertheless, Norway has a large account to settle with the German War Criminals, both the individual, direct perpetrators and the responsible leaders of the German Government, of the Nazi Party and of the Military Forces.

Crimes have been committed in Norway during the war which, both in regard to details and execution, scarcely fall short of the German terror in the other occupied countries, although the crimes, owing to special conditions, were not so extensive in Norway. But all these atrocities, viewed singly or collectively, are in reality the logical consequences of Germany's greatest crime against Norway, viz., the violation of her peace and the attempts to nazify the country, and must in the last analysis be considered from the viewpoint of this background. There is no doubt that Germany's object in Norway was to transform the country ideologically into a Nazi state in order to incorporate it into a Greater Germanic Empire under German leadership. Consciously or unconsciously, every wheel in the German machinery functioned in harmony with this policy.

The Nazi rulers in Germany had been conspiring against Norway's peace and neutrality for a long time before the war broke out. Without warning or declaration of war, the German military forces attacked Norway in 1940, and during the two-months long operations, waged an unscrupulous war, disregarding Inter-

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national Law and indeed every law of humanity. Besides attaining military victories, the Germans aimed at conquering Norway politically. However, they did not succeed in spite of all their political manoeuvering, in spite of the psychological effect in Norway of Germany's great military victories in Europe during the summer of 1940, and in spite of an unscrupulous use of violence. German intentions appeared clearly from Reichskommissar Terboven's speech in September 1940. He stated that it was the purpose of Germany to nazify Norway, directly as well as in co-operation with the traitorous party "Nasjonal Samling". For almost five years these attempts at nazification continued, without success, but with countless unlawful interferences, encroachments and untold suffering for the Norwegian people.

The responsibility for these crimes does not rest only with the individual German soldier, the individual Gestapo agent or civilian official who directly committed the crimes, but also with the German authorities in Norway who ordered, and in many cases even took part directly in the crimes.

But the responsibility does not end here. The highest authorities in Germany share the responsibility for these war crimes, the string pullers behind the German Nazi and military policies, irrespective of whether they directly ordered a certain crime or operation, or whether by broad lines of general policy they aimed at and permitted the German authorities in Norway to carry out their criminal plans regardless of the claims of International Law and the rights of mankind.

In accordance with the St. James Declaration of 13th January 1942, the Moscow Declaration of 1st November 1943, and lastly by Agreement of 8th August 1945 between Great Britain, the U. S. A., the Soviet Union and France, it has been determined that those persons who must be considered responsible for Germany's policies of aggression, war and occupation shall be prosecuted and sentenced by an International Military Tribunal, with its seat in Germany, if they are not prosecuted by the countries where they have committed their chief crimes.

Norway has acceded to the earlier declarations and by Royal Warrant of 13th October 1945, also has adhered to the agreement of 8th August, 1945.

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II. CRIMES AGAINST PEACE

1. PREPARATIONS FOR THE GERMAN WAR OF AGGRESSION

From the very beginning when the Nazi Party took over the political power in Germany in 1933, a distinct line was followed in German foreign policy, partly in accordance with Hitler's own theories, which as an ultimate goal aimed at giving Germany the decisive power in Europe as a first step, and world domination as a second. A crimson line runs through events such as Germany's withdrawal from the League of Nations, the resumption of conscription, the withdrawal from the Locarno Agreement, the march into the Rhineland, the annexation of Austria and later of Czecho-Slovakia, right up to the war in 1939, which was a natural consequence of the "dynamic" German policy, since the Nazi leaders' manifest intention was now to make the last conquest by force of arms.

Officially it was the German Foreign Ministry who conducted the foreign policy during the last years before the war, under the guidance of Ribbentrop. But unofficially and parallel with, and often in conflict with the Foreign Ministry and the Foreign Minister and his special office, "The German Nazi Party's Foreign Affairs Political office", was operating by order of Hitler through "initiatives and impulses". This office was under the charge of Reichsminister Alfred Rosenberg.

No doubt it was a part of the scheme of German expansion to gain a decisive influence or complete control of N o r w a y as well. Particulars of German plans as regards Norway and the activities during the years up to 1939 have not yet been brought to light. Alfred Rosenberg writes in his diary however that as early as June 1939 he delivered to Hitler a memorandum relating to the political-strategic importance of Norway. Among the documents in the Quisling case, is also to be found "A Short Report of the Operations of N. S. D. A. P.'s Foreign Affairs Political Office from 1933—1943" by Alfred Rosenberg. (Appendix 1.) This document gives a clear picture of the German efforts to gain influence in the different countries, and also brings to light the earlier German "intimate" contact with the traitor Quisling in Norway.

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2. PRELUDE TO THE ATTACK ON NORWAY ON 9TH APRIL, 1940

The situation was altered by the outbreak of war in 1939. The efforts to gain influence in the various countries by peaceful means, possibly also through underground and treacherous channels, was a thing of the past. Now weapons were to do the talking. Decisive military considerations implied a German action also against Norway. As a step in the German offensive warfare the control of Norway was important. Norway had a flank-position, which was important as regards the blockade of England, and as a starting point for a direct attack on England as well.

The German Navy was especially determined to secure the command of the Norwegian coast. The German "Seekriegsleitung" had as early as September 1939, prepared a plan for an operation against Norway. This work was not carried further at that time, as the supreme military authorities appeared to have decided to attack France as soon as the campaign in Poland was finished. Notes have been found, however, in the possession of Grand Admiral Raeder, which prove that the Naval Staff constantly kept in mind, and gradually strengthened its view that something had to be done in Norway. (Appendix 2). It is believed that at first Hitler thought he could count on Norway remaining neutral, and that for the time, at least, there was no danger of any Western Allied undertaking in Norway. But that he was giving consideration to these military plans is proven by a statement made by the German military commander in Norway, Colonel-General Falkenhorst. Under examination in Norway, Falkenhorst testified that during a conversation with Hitler at the end of February 1940, he heard Hitler say that he had worked on plans for an action against Norway as far back as in the autumn of 1939.

Reports from official German representation in Norway gave expression to Norway's will as well as ability to remain neutral. Reports from Rosenberg's unofficial foreign service—closely connected with the traitor Quisling and his people—gave information to the contrary.

In December 1939 Quisling came to Germany and insisted that England was preparing an occupation of Norway and that the Norwegian government had a secret agreement with England not to resist (Appendices 3 and 4). Quisling was given an audience with Grand Admiral Raeder and Reichsminister Rosenberg, who at once believed Quisling's stories. Quisling came as a Godsend, from Raeder's viewpoint, and the latter made certain that Quisling was given an audience with Hitler at once (Appendices 5 and 6). Thus it would appear that the German Navy and Quisling jointly convinced Hitler of the necessity for attacking Norway as the next move in the war, and in the middle of December 1939 it was resolved that military preparations should be made for the attack on Norway.

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In January 1940 Hitler gave an order through the Chief of Staff of the High Command, General Keitel, that an operations staff be established to work out operational plans against Norway, such as the disposal of tonnage, the size of the military forces, the points of attack, etc. (Appendix 7). On February 20th, 1940, General Falkenhorst took over charge of the military preparations and these were completed one month later. Alongside these military preparations, the political preparations were undertaken at the same time in co-operation with Quisling. Hitler promised Quisling financial support for his "Greater Germanic-inspired movement". In January 1940 it was, among other things, decided that Quisling was to be supported by 200,000 gold marks; the amount was later fixed at 10,000 pounds Sterling per month for 3 months from March 15th, 1940. Thus the decision to attack was made and the preparations were completed b e f o r e the minelaying in Norwegian territorial waters by the Western Powers—the circumstance which German propaganda assigned as the cause for the German action. At the end of March, the day for the invasion was fixed as 9th April, 1940.

The German plan was based on a complete surprise attack and occupation of Norway. This was the condition essential to its successful accomplishment. How secret the plan was kept is attested to by the fact that Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop in the course of an examination stated that he had heard of the plan only 36 hours before the attack started. Quisling was merely a pawn in the game and was not directly informed, although he might have had some idea of the impending events, when he, in the beginning of April 1940, was called to Copenhagen in order to give military information to a representative of the German General Staff.

The essential point in the military plans was that the main force and the material were to be brought to Norway chiefly by warship and plane, so that German intentions should not be revealed to the English fleet by the presence of a large fleet of transport ships. At the same time, innocent-looking colliers were to be used, with weapons, material and a few soldiers on board. Some time before the invasion these boats, like "Trojan Horses", had run into Norwegian ports.

Hitler had decided that a diplomatic action should take place simultaneously with the military operation. The plan was that the German troops who were to be in Oslo on the morning of April 9th, should immediately arrest the Government and the members of the Storting and try to force the King to appoint a Quisling Government.

The plan did not succeed completely, particularly because the German cruiser "Blücher", with the troops for Oslo on board, was sunk by a Norwegian torpedo-battery in the Oslo-fjord, so that the King, the Storting and the Government escaped and thus upset the German political plans. By and large, however, the military operation proceeded according to plan.

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3. CONCLUSION

The responsibility for this systematic planning and preparation to include Norway, too, in Germany's aggressive war, rests first and foremost with Adolf Hitler himself and the German Government, but it rests also with the supreme military leaders, especially the leaders of the German Navy and the Army High Command who carried out the orders for the planning and execution of this unprovoked attack on a neutral country.

Besides the Government and the Military Staffs must perhaps be mentioned "Reichsleiter" Alfred Rosenberg. Although he was not, according to the informaation at hand, particularly occupied with German foreign policy at that time, he appears, according to available evidence, to have played an important part in the "Affair Norway", particularly through the activity of his "Foreign Affairs Political Office" and through his close co-operation with Quisling and his full exploitation of Quisling's treasonable activities. This co-operation was undoubtedly of decisive importance as regards the German Wehrmacht's successful execution of the attack on Norway.

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III. CRIMES AGAINST THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WAR

In a war, the aim of the country at war is to gain complete victory over her opponent. In order to attain this objective, the belligerent can make use of numerous different means,—not only the principal one, firing against military objectives, but she can also resort to stratagem, adopt measures against enemy property, the civilian population, etc. However, according to International Law she does not possess absolute liberty in the choice of means to harm her opponent, and the rules relating to this subject are among the most important ones contained in the laws of war.

The rules referred to are firstly the 4th Hague Convention and the "Rules of Land Warfare" which form a part of it; then, the various conventions relating to air and sea warfare, treatment of the sick and wounded, prisoners-of-war, etc. Besides these treaty-recorded rules there are the acknowledged customary rules for the conduct of the International Law, i.e. the principles of the International Law, as they appear in "adopted customs among civilized nations, of the laws of humanity and of the demands of the public conscience". (The preamble to the 4th Hague Convention of 1907).

Germany's attack on Norway, the war in 1940 and the five years of occupation following it, form an endless series of intentional violations of these rules of International Law, and they must consequently be regarded as War Crimes. This report will cite numerous examples of such violations.

The recording of these War Crimes is founded on the list prepared for use at the Peace Conference in 1919 and adopted as a basis by the United Nations' War Crimes Commission.

However, that which gives each of these crimes its really gross character, regardless of the nature of the act, and that which makes it possible to see all the encroachments as a whole, as one big crime, that which entitles us to put the responsibility on the political and military leaders in Germany, is the fact that all the crimes seem to have taken place according to a definite, higher plan: Germany's struggle to introduce Nazism through war in all countries.

H1158 - 0048

1. THE WAR IN NORWAY IN 1940

The German attack on Norway on the 9th of April, 1940, brought war to Norway for the first time in 126 years. For two months the war was carried on throughout the country, causing destruction to the value of 250,000,000 kroner, at the then existing market values. When rebuilding, the rise in prices has to be taken into account, so that the damage will amount to approximately 50 % more. More than 40,000 houses were damaged or destroyed, and about 1000 civilians were killed, but the military losses were few, only 900 being killed.

Making use of Hitler's own words, the attack on Norway was "kriegswichtig, kriegsnotwendig, und kriegsentscheidend". This being the background, it seemed that all methods of warfare were legal, if they served the German plans.

Attack without warning or declaration of war.

The German plans of action were based on the assumption that the attack on Norway, if it was to be a success—had to be kept secret, as far as possible. Not even the traitor Quisling was informed as to the time of the attack. Part of the plan was also not to give Norway warning or make any declaration of war. On the 9th of April, 1940, at 4:30 o'clock in the morning, the German Minister in Oslo appeared at the Norwegian Foreign Office, and set forth a series of demands on behalf his Government. But several hours previous to this presentation of demands the German Wehrmacht had already started a full-scale attack on Norway.

The memorandum which Germany presented, was not—in any usual sense—an ultimatum; on the contrary, it stated as a fact that the Germans had already started military operations, which would lead to the occupation of strategically important points in Norway, and that the German Government from now on was "taking over the protection of Norway". The memorandum emphasized that the German troops did not come as enemies, but maintained that Norwegian resistance would be broken by all possible means.

During the first fortnight of the war, the Germans played on many strings. The whole time they maintained the pretence that the German troops had come to the country as "friends and protectors", but at the same time, General Falkenhorst issued drastic proclamations to the population, citing as authority the provisions of the Hague Convention's "Rules of Land Warfare" which relate to belligerent military occupation.

Not until the original political plans of the Germans had completely failed —in the first instance because the legal Norwegian authorities escaped from the capital, and secondly because the King and his government rejected the political

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demands of the Germans—did the Germans throw away the mask and acknowledge that a state of war existed. But even then, this was merely incidentally acknowledged in „Führer-Erlass" from Berlin, dated 24th April, 1940, which was not even made public in Norway.

The Unrestricted Air Warfare. The Luftwaffe's ravaging in Norway.

During the fighting in Norway, the German Air Force was totally superior to the Norwegian, and later on, to the Allied Air Forces. This superiority was exploited without any restraint whatsoever. The actions of the German planes during the Polish campaign will be remembered. The Germans there had started the unrestricted air warfare and Herman Göring's Luftwaffe continued their tactics during the campaign in Norway by a senseless bombing of small and unfortified towns and places, farms, churches, hospitals, and hospital ships, and other non-military objectives.

The German planes also practically hunted the King and the Government, bombing to pieces the towns and inhabited places, where—probably through espionage reports—they believed the authorities were staying, even when there was no military staff there. This kind of terrorising "warfare" was surely carried out in accordance with some definite plan from the highest quarters, probably as revenge for the defeat which the German political plans had suffered through the firm attitude of the King and Government.

These are some of the bomb-ravaged and destroyed Norwegian towns, where in all about 1000 civilians were killed and many more wounded:

Elverum: bombed on 11th April, 1940, about 1200 buildings and their contents damaged to a total value of 6,200,000 kroner (Appendix 8).

Nybergsund: bombed 11th April, 1940, about 200 items of damage, value 0.35 million kroner.

Kristiansund N.: bombed from 28th April to 2nd May, 1940, about 5,700 items of damage, value 56,500,000 kroner (Appendix 9).

Molde: bombed on the 15th April, 1940, about 1600 items of damage, value 11.6 million kroner (Appendices 10 & 11).

Namsos: bombed on the 20th April, 1940, about 2,100 items of damage, value 16.5 million kroner (Appendix No. 12).

Steinkjer: bombed on 21st and 22nd April, 1940, about 2,200 items of damage, value 20.7 million kroner (Appendix No. 13).

Bodö: bombed on the 27th May, 1940, about 3,500 items of damage, value 35.5 million kroner (Appendices Nos. 14 & 15).

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Hospitals and hospital ships were favourite targets of the German planes. For instance, Bodö hospital was bombed on the 27th May, 1940 and the patients who were carried out of the burning building were machine-gunned by the German airmen. (Appendix No. 16). The hospital ship "Dronning Maud" was bombed and sunk on 1st May, 1940, at Foldvik in Ibestad, with loss of in all 42 lives, including those of 7 doctors and 26 nurses and 40 wounded, despite the fact that the ship was clearly marked with the Red Cross emblem. The same is true of "Brann 4", which was bombed and sunk on the 29th April, 1940. This ship was also plainly marked with a Red Cross and carried only medical supplies and wounded. 5 people were killed by this attack.

Reports regarding these violations were sent to the International Red Cross Committee in Geneva by the Norwegian Government.

On German pilots who had been shot down, were found orders to the effect that all places that could be used as military quarters and all movements on the roads were to be attacked ("die Wege sind abzikämmen"). As a result of this, farms and larger settlements all over the country were needlessly fired upon from the planes, regardless of whether military personnel were present or not.

Shooting and Abuse of the Civilian Population.

As a further illustration of German violations of International Law in the conduct of war, it may be stated that German soldiers repeatedly murdered Norwegian civilians on the pretence that the latter had fired upon the soldiers. According to investigations made later by the Norwegian police, it was proved that the German accusations were not true.

As examples it may be mentioned that on the 13th April, 1940, 2 women 30 years of age were shot at Ringerike. On the 15th April, 4 civilians, of whom 2 were boys of 15 and 16 years of age were shot in Aadal. One of those murdered was shot through the head, and had also been bayonetted in the stomach. On the 19th of April, 4 civilians from the country, of whom 2 were women and one a little boy, 3 years of age, were shot at Ringsaker.

On the 20th of April, 4 men were killed at Ringsaker. They were shot in the back with a revolver. The Germans also tried to kill another man in the same way, but the bullet went through the neck and came out in the lower jaw without killing the man, who is perhaps the only person who has survived a German "neckshot". (The occurence has been described in the periodical of the Norwegian Medical Association, 1945, No. 1 (7) page 7). These executions were performed on the spot, without reference to law or judgment. In most of the cases there do not even appear to have been proceedings which might be characterized as a summary court-martial. In several instances the Germans burned the farms

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where they had committed the crimes. In numerous cases Norwegian civilians were forced at the point of a revolver to direct the Germans and others were forced to drive the Germans in cars and buses to the combat zones. During attacks, the Germans placed Norwegian civilians in front of them to stop the Norwegian troops from shooting, according to a Communiqué from the Commander in Northern Norway of the 27th of April, 1940. On the 20th of April, 1940, the Germans forced the crew of a Norwegian fishing boat to steer the boat, full of German soldiers but flying the Norwegian flag, along the Trengereidfjord against a Norwegian guard post. The result of the German attack was a hard struggle which resulted in a German withdrawal with several wounded and dead But the Norwegian master of the fishing boat lost his life on this expedition and one of the crew was wounded.

Other Violations.

In different places in Norway the Germans appeared in Norwegian uniforms during battles. This was the case in the district of Bergen according to a Communiqué of the 14th of April, 1940, during the struggles in Valdres and in Narvik. Reports have been received that at one place the Germans even put on womens' clothes, in order to reach a favourable position.

Where the Germans passed, the civilians found their homes in an indescribable condition after the battle, even if the Germans had not set fire to the houses. The so-called German "informal requisitions" which actually meant plundering and destruction, were later compensated for to the extent of about 9 million kroner in all, partly by Norwegian authorities and partly by German authorities, that is, by money drawn out of the Bank of Norway (Norges Bank) by the Germans.

On 25th April, 1940, Ulvik in Hardanger was reduced to ruins, as a reprisal measure, as the Germans claimed that civilians there had fired on German troops. Damage was done to more than 400 buildings and chattels amounting to a total of 2.3 million kroner.

2. THE ATTEMPTS TO NAZIFY NORWAY

The German Aim.

The aim of the Germans was a "National Socialist Norway". This became clear after the speech made by Reichskommissar Terboven in September 1940. The tone of the propaganda was to the effect that Norway had to find her place in the European "New Order", and solve the problems which might be assigned to her within the frame-work of a common European development. Norway's

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economy had to be shorn of its "Anglophile" attributes, and fitted into the European "Wirtschaftsraum", under German leadership; likewise, the country had to link its political future confidently to „the mighty Greater Germanic State".

These empty phrases only described in a roundabout way the already mentioned planned and conscious German attempts to mould Norway according to true Nazi thought. By these means the country could be fitted into a "Greater Germanie State", under the leadership of Germany, and by making full use of a political system created by compulsion, and of the same kind as the German product, Norway could be given the appearance of having maintained her independence and integrity, while in reality the country would become a pure vassal state under Germany.

The German Tools.

The most important G e r m a n tools were the Reichskommissariat and the Police. By decree ef 24th April, 1940, Hitler appointed a "Reichskommissar" for the occupied territories, who was to look after the interests of the German Reich. (Appendix 16). To this office was appointed J o s e f T e r b o v e n, German War Criminal No. 1 in Norway, who committed suicide immediately before the German capitulation. Terboven acted immediately under Hitler and received directions and instructions from him. The decree of 24th April, 1940, decided that the Reichskommissar might employ German police-organizations to execute his orders. At his side, therefore, Terboven had "der Höhere SS.- und Polizeiführer" General Rediess, War Criminal No. 2, who committed suicide together with Terboven.

The police were actually subject to "Reichssicherheitshauptamt" in Berlin (the chief of which originally was S.S. Obergruppenführer Heydrich, and after his death S.S. Obergruppenführer Kaltenbrunner), but received orders from Terboven as well, a situation which led to considerable friction and intrigue.

The Reichskommissariat and the police were organized on the lines shown in Appendices 17 and 18.

The N o r w e g i a n tools of the Germans were Norway's traitor No. 1, Vidkun Quisling and his Nazi party, Nasjonal Samling, with its various branches, the Hird etc.

By the exploitation of Quisling and his people (illegal under International Law), the Germans were saved the daily routine work in the administration of Norway. Terboven issued, for instance, only a small number of decrees, barely accounting for 200 pages in his "Verordnungsblatt". The N.S. Ministers and Quisling, however, issued a flood of "laws" and "decrees", which fill more than 3500 pages in "Norsk Lovtidend".

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The Germans themselves made all important decisions, such as policy for the nazification and exploitation of Norwegian resources for German war aims, the struggle against the Norwegian resistance movement, etc.

The Quisling government was only a puppet government and never had any real power except that allowed by the Germans. During the entire occupation Hitler's decree of 24th April, 1940, was in force, under which Terboven had supreme authority and was responsible for the administration.

Means employed by the Germans.

The measures which the Germans and their Norwegian helpers employed were first of all the setting aside of such democratic liberties as freedom of speech, freedom of the press and right of free assembly and secondly interference with and change in existing public institutions, encroachment on the democratic traditions of Norway and clearing out of democratic elements in public life, "gleichschaltung" of schools and religious life, accompanied throughout by compulsion and terror in all conceivable forms: Mass arrests, establishment of concentration camps, deportation of civilians, setting up of martial law, establishing of police courts and summary courts martial, killing of hostages, execution and torture of prisoners, orders for collective punishment, senseless ravaging and destruction of Norwegian public and private property, etc.

Highlights of the Development.

In a proclamation of 25th September, 1940, Terboven declared the King and his House deposed; likewise, any propaganda benefitting the Royal Family was prohibited by a decree promulgated shortly thereafter (Appendices 19 and 20).

A decree of 25th September, 1940, also dissolved all the political parties, except Nasjonal Samling, and the property of the political parties was "liquidated". (Appendix 21). Thereupon Terboven formed a "government" of 13 so-called "Kommissarische Staatsräte", of which 10 were members of Nasjonal Samling.

The basis for interference in public life was laid down in decree of 4th October, 1940, according to which "public employees, who through their political behaviour do not warrant the belief that, with all the powers at their command, they will work for the political "New Order", may be discharged from the service". (Appendix 22).

In December 1940 the judges of the Supreme Court resigned their offices as a protest against the illegal interference of the Germans and the Norwegian Nazis with legislation and administration, in violation of section 43 of the Hague Rules.

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By a decree of the "Commissary Minister" for Home Affairs, of December 21st, 1940, the 100-year old democratic system of municipal administration was nazified through the introduction of the "führer"-principle.

Throughout the year 1941 the "Gleichschaltung" of the Workers' organizations was effected, reaching its climax in September 1941, when several Trade Union people were sentenced to death and shot, while others were sentenced to long terms of hard labour in Germany by a summary court martial established during the martial law period.

On February 1st, 1942, Vidkun Quisling became "Minister President" of a Nazi Government under the supervision of the Germans (Appendix 23), and the efforts at nazification were now greatly intensified. One of the first "official actions" of this "Government" was to promulgate a "law" aimed at nazifying Norwegian youth. In accordance with the German model, every Norwegian boy and girl was to serve in an organization under Nasjonal Samling from their 10th to their 18th year, and similarly, all the teachers in the country were to be forced into a Nazi Teachers' Association. At the same time a policy was laid down for the teaching of Nazi ideology in the schools, for measures to be applied against pupils who did not show "a positive attitude", etc.

Hardly any other measure had brought Nazism so close to the lives of Norwegian citizens, so close to their homes. The Quisling decrees provoked a storm of protest from teachers and parents all over the country, energetically supported by the Norwegian clergy, headed by Norway's seven bishops.

The Germans and the Quislings did not hesitate to adopt counter-measures. The teachers who refused to become members of the "Teachers' Association", were threatened with the loss of their position, their salary and their right to a pension, and also that they would be sent to compulsory labour in the North of Norway. But Norway's 14,000 teachers did not give in, and the mass arrests began. By the end of March 1942, 1300 teachers had been put in prison, some being placed in concentration camps, some sent to compulsory labour in different parts of the country, often together with Russian prisoners-of-war and exposed to the same inhuman treatment which the latter received. The deportation of teachers by s/s "Skjerstad" from Trondheim to Finnmark was particularly cruel. Five hundred teachers were stowed together like cattle under the most unhygienic conditions.

In spite of all encroachments, the teachers' front resisted the nazification and in the end the Germans and the Quislings had to give in without having carried out their plans.

This fight for the young people was also one of the factors contributing to the struggle of the Norwegian church against the attacks by the authorities of the "New Era", a struggle that led to Norway's bishops and clergymen resigning

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their offices in protest. Many clergymen were also imprisoned or banished from their homes.

Another part of the nazification programme was the persecution of the Jews in Norway in October 1942, when the Germans—partly in co-operation with the Quislings—started mass arrests of Jewish men, women and children. After plundering and brutal treatment in concentration camps the persons arrested numbering about 750, were deported to Germany and Poland, where practically all of them died in gas chambers and concentration camps. The property of the Jews was "liquidated" by a "law" of October 26th, 1942.

In spite of the fact that these efforts, throughout the years, might have made it appear that Norway was nazified, "gleichschaltet" and tid of the Jews, this was only a superficial phenonomen. Beneath the thin shell of official Nazism the opposition of the Norwegian population grew from 1940 onwards into a strong and wide-ranging organization, the Norwegian Home Front. Because of the opposition on the part of the population, specific German actions, such as the attempt in the spring of 1943 to mobilize Norwegian workers and Norwegian resources for the German war effort, resulted in fiasco.

During the last years of the occupation the Germans' attempts at nazification grew less comprehensive and it seemed that they were only intent upon keeping the positions they believed they had gained. The great military rebuffs on all fronts were certainly contributory factors.

But German terrorism continued until the last day of the occupation.

Conclusion.

The attempt to nazify the country was perhaps the most offensive crime committed by Germany against Norway, because it was a crime against the spirit of Democracy and its effects and implications would have resulted in the moral destruction of the Norwegian people.

Further, the attempts at nazification also violated International Law. It was violative of this law to dethrone the King and his House, to encourage and use the traitorous organization, Nasjonal Samling, to make use of the "Nazi Commissary Ministers", and later the "Minister President" Quisling, to the extent to which the Germans did and finally to interfere with and alter Norway's public institutions. Actually, an occupant has only a temporary de facto control over the occupied territory and must not undertake anything with an effect which is intended to continue beyond the time of occupation. According to Article 43 of the Hague Convention, the laws of the occupied country are to be respected during the occupation unless there exists any absolute hindrance.

The attempts to Nazify Norway represent just that systematic and intentional War Crime in the wake of which come all the cruelties and all the misery

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already mentioned and of which a more detailed account will be given below. They constitute at one and the same time the means and the end and must be viewed against the background of this preordained plan.

The responsibility for the efforts to nazify the country and the consequences of these efforts rests first of all with Terboven. But Terboven was after all only the exponent of German Nazi policy, the authors of which occupied the leading positions in the Party, the State and the military forces in Germany.

3. RESULTS OF THE ATTEMPTS TO NAZIFY NORWAY

A. CRIMES AGAINST THE LIVES, THE BODIES AND THE HEALTH OF NORWEGIAN CITIZENS

a. Murder and systematic terrorism—killing of hostages.

Executions without Trial.

On several occasions Norwegians have been killed although no judgment had been pronounced. The following examples will be mentioned here:

1. On 26th April, 1942, 2 German policemen who tried to arrest 2 Norwegian patriots were killed on an island on the west coast of Norway. In order to avenge this, four days later, 18 young boys were shot without trial. All these 18 Norwegians had been in prison since 22nd February the same year, and therefore had nothing to do with this affair.

2. On October 6th, 1942, Terboven proclaimed Martial Law in Trondheim. On the same day 10 well known Norwegian citizens were taken as hostages and executed the same day in expiation for various attempts at sabotage which had been made. The Germans made no attempt to prove that these Norwegians had any connection with the sabotage.

3. On 14th October, 1943, a report was published stating that 5 Norwegians had been executed without trial, because they belonged to circles which intellectually and politically were believed to be responsible for the sabotage on the railway line Oslo—Kristiansand S. The report admitted that the Germans had not been able to find the persons who had committed the sabotage.

4. About 20th July, 1944, a number of Norwegians were taken from Grini concentration camp and executed without trial. The reason is still unknown, but on account of the date it is not impossible that it may have been the Gestapo's desire to take revenge for the attempt on Hitler's life.

5. After the German capitulation, the bodies of 44 Norwegian citizens were found in graves. These citizens had been shot and no report of the execution had ever been published. There is, consequently, reason to believe that most of them were shot without a trial.

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The executions were often effected by a shot through the back of the neck or a revolver bullet through the ear, the hands of the victims being tied to their backs. (Appendices Nos. 24, 25, 26, 27 and 28).

Executions following Trial by SS- und Polizeigericht Nord.

By decree of 17th September, 1941, Terboven extended the jurisdiction of the German SS Tribunal to cover violations by Norwegian citizens of decrees promulgated by the Reichskommissar.

This tribunal was completely controlled by Terboven. The judicial proceedings were mainly summary, and the accused had no adequate opportunity to defend himself. The sentence was usually carried out shortly after it had been pronounced. The trials were not open to the public. The proceedings and the findings were not published, merely the sentence or a short description of the offence for which the accused was sentenced.

More than 150 Norwegian citizens were sentenced to death by this court, while many others were sentenced to long terms of hard labour.

Executions following Trial by Court Martial and Summary Court Martial.

In addition to those sentenced to death by the SS- und Polizeigericht Nord, 76 Norwegians were sentenced to death by various German Courts Martial and 52 by Summary Courts Martial established during the state of Martial Law. The Norwegian Nazis also set up summary courts martial which sentenced 16 Norwegians to death.

Deaths of Norwegian Citizens as a Result of Cruel Treatment During Examination and in Concentration Camps.

In a large number of cases, imprisoned Norwegian patriots died or committed suicide on account of the torture and cruel treatment they were subjected to during examination and the inhuman treatment in the German prison camps (Appendices Nos. 29 and 30).

The number of known cases for the Oslo district is 52. The number of victims for all of Norway is, without a doubt, considerably higher.

In concentration camps and in prisons in Germany about 800 Norwegian women and men have met their death. Many of these were sent to Germany as N. N. (i.e "Nacht und Nebel")—prisoners pursuant to the notorious „Keitel-Erlass".

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In addition to this there are the Jews from Norway who perished in concentration camps and gas chambers in Germany and in Poland. Of the 750 who were deported only 13 have returned, and according to available reports it must be presumed that the others have been annihiliated.

Total Number of Death Victims.

The total number of Norwegians who have died during the occupation, by execution, torture and ill-treatment, suicide etc., in political prisons and concentration camps in Norway and in Germany, may be put down at approximately 2100.

b. Arrest and Torture of Civilians.

It is estimated that approximately 40,000 Norwegian citizens were, during the occupation, imprisoned in the various Nazi prisons and concentration camps in Norway. On an average, each of them was imprisoned for a year and a half, but for a large number of prisoners the period was as long as 3 and 4 years, and for some even longer. The best known concentration camps in Norway were: Grini (total number of prisoners during the years of occupation about 20,000), Falstad, Ulven, Espeland and Sydspissen. To this must be added the different concentration camps for prisoners of war, especially Russians and Jugo-Slavs.

During the occupation about 7500 Norwegian citizens were sent as prisoners to Germany. Of these about 1150 were prisoners-of-war and about 650 students. Of the remainder, 5400 were political prisoners of which about 250 were women (not including the Jewish women sent to Poland).

In a large number of cases torture was applied during examination. A „formal" general authorization for the administration of such treatment is reported to have been given in 1941 by the Reichssicherheitshauptamt in Berlin, under which the German Security Police in Norway worked. The authorization permitted beating with a stick or a rubber implement, and later use of calf-pinchers which had been tried by the Reichssicherheitshauptamt, and after 1944, the application of cold baths—a method tried by the Gestapo in France and proved to be "effective".

But also far more brutal forms of torture were made use of during examinations and many Norwegians have received lasting injuries from the treatment to which they were subjected, or have died as a result of the torture applied to them.

Also in the concentration camps and in prisons, the prisoners were exposed to ill-treatment and torture. Hard penal exercise, often in the middle of the night; hard compulsory labour, without any regard to condition of health; blows, flogging, kicking, dark cells, insufficient food etc., resulted in lasting injuries and in many cases death for a large number of Norwegian patriots.

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c. Deportation of Civilians.

On several occasions the Germans compelled Norwegian citizens to leave their homes and sent them to other parts of Norway or to Germany and Poland Largescale deportations usually took place after raids or alleged sabotage in different districts. As examples may be mentioned:

1. Immediately after the raid on Lofoten, March 4th, 1941, Terboven took a plane to Svolvaer and ordered the most serious reprisals. Seventy persons from 17 to 70 years of age were arrested and sent to Oslo and then interned in a concentration camp at Hakadal, near Oslo. Later they were transferred to Grini.

2. After the liquidation of the two German policemen in Televaag (see page 22, a. 1) 26th April, 1942, the whole population of Televaag was deported and the place was at the same time destroyed. Seventy-four persons—all the adult male population—were deported to Germany, where most of them perished, and the women and children were interned in Norway.

3. On 26th November, 1942, Jewish women and children in Oslo were arrested in their homes and brought on board the German steamer "Donau". The same day the previously arrested Jewish men were brought on board the "Donau", which then left Oslo with 500 to 600 Jews on board. In February 1943, 120 women, children and old men, all Jews, were deported from the country. All these Jews were sent to Germany and Poland. Only 2 per cent of them—13 in all—escaped death in concentration camps and gas chambers, and have returned to Norway after the liberation.

4. In many other cases the Germans and the "Quislings" practised compulsory transfer of civilians as punishment. Clergymen, for instance, were forbidden to remain in their home districts. The grossest case of compulsory transfer of civilians was the evacuation of most of the population of Finnmark county, as a part of the German "scorched earth" policy in Finnmark, during the advance of the Russians in November 1944 (see Appendix 31 and page 26, 4).

It has already been mentioned above that about 7500 Norwegians were sent to Germany as prisoners during the occupation.

d. Compulsory labour by civilians as part of the enemy's war effort.

In the spring of 1942 it became necessary for the Germans to mobilize increased manpower also in the occupied countries, in order to maintain Germany's war production, and to build up defences around "Festung Europa".

By decree of 21st March, 1942, signed by Hitler, Lammers and Keitel, Fritz Sauckel was appointed "Generalbevollmächtigten für den Arbeitseinsatz" in Germany and the occupied countries, and on 22nd August, 1942, Sauckel issued

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an order which resulted in decrees being promulgated in all the occupied countries in preparation for the molibization of persons for compulsory labour in the German war machine.

The result of Sauckel's order as to Norway was that on 3rd February, 1943, a Quisling "law" relating to compulsory registration of Norwegian men and women for so-called "national labour effort" was promulgated. Terboven and Quisling openly admitted that the law was promulgated in order that the Norwegian people should use their manpower for the benefit of the German war effort. In a speech on 2nd February Terboven stated, among other things, that he himself and the German Reich stood behind this law, and he threatened to use force against anyone who tried to prevent its execution.

The "national labour effort" law met with strong opposition from the Norwegian people, and despite the use of force, the Compulsory Labour Mobilization turned into a fiasco.

A few hundred of the mobilized labourers were sent to Northern Norway to work on German military installations. Others were enlisted for work in Organisation Todt or Legion Speer, both being organisations of quasi-military character.

B. CRIMES AGAINST NORWEGIAN PROPERTY

a. Wanton ravaging and destruction.

1. After the raid on Lofoten on the 4th March, 1941, the Germans ordered all houses belonging to Norwegians, or relatives of Norwegians, who had voluntarily accompanied the Allied troops to England, or people who had assisted such Norwegians, to be completely burned. Pursuant to this order 10 houses were burned while the inhabitants were forced to look on. The damage totalled, altogether, more than half a million kroner.

2. A similar burning took place at Reine in Lofoten on the 6th January, 1942, causing damage amounting to one-quarter million kroner.

3. To avenge the death of the two German policemen who were shot on the 26th April, 1942, (see page 22, a, 1) at Televaag, the entire place was laid waste. More than 90 properties with 334 buildings were totally destroyed, causing damage to buildings and chattels (furniture and fishing outfits) amounting to a total of 4.2 million kroner.

4. As a result of the advance of the Russian troops and the retreat of the German Army in Finnmark, October—November 1944, the Germans practised the "scorched earth" policy for the first time in Norway. Orders were issued that the civilian population was to evacuate and that all houses, transport and stores were to be destroyed. As a result of this about 30,000 houses were damaged,

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apart from 12,000 items of damage to chattels, amounting to a total of about 176 million kroner (Appendices 31 and 32).

5. On many occasions the Germans burned cottages and summer farms in various districts, because they insisted that saboteurs and "bandits" had lodged there, as, for example at Hardangervidda in the spring of 1943, Østre Slidre in the summer of 1944, Furnes and Vang in January 1945. The damage amounted to several hundred thousand kroner. At Eggedal in April 1945, the Germans burned cottages as a revenge for the defeat they had suffered fighting Norwegian Home Front Forces (damage of about 150,000 kroner) and at Masfjorden in May 1945, farms and summer farms were burned for the same reason (damage about 350,000 kroner).

6. On numerous occasions damage was caused to Norwegian property by illegal encroachments on the part of the Germans and the Quislings, for example by illegal confiscation, seizures, thefts, ravaging raids, penal measures against patriots etc.

b. Confiscation of Property.

During the occupation the Germans promulgated several decrees relating to confiscation of property belonging to Norwegian subjects. The decrees affected both Norwegians who had left the country (that is, by reason of the Gestapo pursueing them) and Norwegians who had been arrested, whether their case had been brought before the courts or not.

A decree promulgated by Terboven on 26th October, 1941, encompassed not only property belonging to persons who or associations which had "promoted efforts of anti-German or anti-national character", but also property belonging to persons who and associations which "might in the future promote such efforts".

As examples may be mentioned: the seizure of the property belonging to political parties, to the Masonic Order, to the Scout organizations and various humanitarian organizations, etc. In 1941 wireless sets belonging to Norwegian citizens were also seized and later confiscated by the Germans. The total value of the confiscated wireless sets amounted to some 120 million kroner and only relatively few of the wireless sets have been recovered since the German capitulation.

c. Imposition of Collective Punishments.

As reprisal for alleged sabotage, Allied raids, bombing by Allied planes, etc. the Germans imposed collective punishments on civilian populations and communities.

As examples may be mentioned: After the raid on Lofoten on the 4th March, 1941 the population of the small community of Østvågøy was compelled to pay

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100,000 kroner. The community was also made to pay for the maintenance of the families of Germans and Quislings who were taken prisoner by the Allies. After the British raid on Oslo on the 25th September, 1942, 100 Oslo citizens were compelled to pay altogether 3 and one-half million kroner to cover the damage caused. In January 1941 Trondheim, Stavanger and Vest-Opland were compelled to pay 60,000, 50,000 and 100,000 kroner respectively. In September 1941, Stavanger "municipality" had to pay a penalty of 2,000,000 kroner for alleged sabotage of German telegraph-cables. In August 1941, Rogaland had to pay 500,000 kroner and Ålesund 100,000 kroner.

d. The Exploitation of Norway: Unauthorized Requisitions and Levies and Debasement of Norway's Currency.

Since the first day of the war, German war-economy aimed at the exploitation of all German-occupied areas. As early as 18th April, 1940, Hitler ordered that exploitation of Norway's economy could begin, and that Norway, for this purpose, was to be regarded as an "enemy state" (Appendix 33).

As a result of this the Germans organized a regular and systematic plundering of Norway, which entailed extensive and lasting, harmful consequences to the country's economic life.

The Germans accomplished this in many different ways. In the first place they requisitioned goods and services without compensation, to an extent entirely disproportionate to Norway's means (contrary to Article 52 of the Hague Convention). The controlling factor in this connection was solely Germany's ability to wage war, the harm done to Norwegian economy being of no consequence. Every tree in Norwegian forests was to be chopped down if the German war needs demanded it (Appendix 34). Without being able to give an exact figure, the value of uncompensated German requisitions, etc., during the occupation, will probably amount to 1,200 million kroner or more. Part of this amount has, however, been charged to the Norwegian State Budget, because the Germans forced the Norwegian State to pay compensation for properties requisitioned by them.

But the Germans requisitioned also against payment and they bought goods and commodities which more or less voluntarily were sold to them and paid for them, not with their own funds, but with funds which the Bank of Norway was compelled to place at their disposition. This amounted to 7 million kroner per day, and at the end of the occupation, on 7th May, 1945, the Germans had consumed a net amount of 11341 million kroner in the Bank of Norway, an amount that might be taken as an index of the purchase of goods and services by the Germans outside the Norwegian-German Clearing System. The Norwegian State was guarantor for the amount to the Bank of Norway.

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The German occupation of Norway also brought with it an interruption of the country's normal trade with most of the other countries outside the German sphere of influence. The Germans exploited this compulsorily increased German trade to their own advantage in every possible way; for example, by raising the price on everything which was sold to Norway and by keeping the prices down on everything that was bought there.

The "occupational costs" themselves for Norway amount to more than 12,000,000,000 kroner, and represent more for each Norwegian citizen than for the citizen of any other occupied country whose statistics are available for comparison.

The Norwegian State's budget also increased tremendously, as a result of the German occupation, due, among other things, to expenditure in connection with the Nazi police force, Nazi propaganda etc. These expenditures amount to about 900 million kroner.

In addition of these must be added other damages for which Germany must be regarded as responsible; for example, to Norwegian industry, navigation, communications, residences, etc.

All in all, Norway's claim for compensation against Germany amounts to 21,000,000,000 kroner or 4,700,000,000 dollars (Appendix 35).

H1158 – 0064

IV. CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY

A series of the crimes which are listed in section III, crimes against the laws and customs of war, must also be regarded as crimes against humanity, as such crimes are described in Art. 6, c, in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal of 8th August, 1945. This is true of the murder of civilian prisoners and hostages, the arrest and torture of civilians, the deportation of civilians, and the compulsory labour of civilians. (See page 22—26.)

As a crime against humanity, special mention must be made of the cruelties and miseries which were inflicted on the Jewish population of Norway. (See page 25, 3.) The "Jewish problem" was one of the main policies of the Nazi programme and the "carrying out" of this policy has cost lives of millions of innocent human beings. No "Jewish problem" has ever existed in Norway, and the Jews constituted only a small minority of the population, only about ½ pro mille. In spite of this, also this part of the nazification system had to be carried out in Norway. One-half of the Jews in Norway managed to escape the Nazi tormentors. The other half was, as already stated, deported to Germany and Poland, and of them only 13 came back.

H1158 – 0065

APPENDICES

Appendix 1.

Kurzer Tätigkeitsbericht des Aussenpolitischen Amtes der NSDAP. von 1933—43.

Bei der Begründung des Aussenpolitischen Amtes am 1.4.1933 gab der Führer die Weisung, dass es sich nicht zu einer grossen Behörde auswachsen sollte, vielmehr durch Initiative und Anregungen seine Wirksamkeit zu entfalten hätte.

Entsprechend der von vornherein ausserordentlich feindseligen Stellungnahme der Sovjetregierung in Moskau wandte das neugegründete Amt seine besondere Aufmerksamkeit den inneren Zuständen in der Sowjetunion zu als auch den Auswirkungen des Weltbolschewismus vorwiegend in den übrigen europäischen Ländern. Es trat mit den verschiedensten dem Nationalsozialismus zuneigenden und den Bolschewismus bekämpfenden Gruppen in Verbindung, wobei es sein Hauptaugenmerk auf die an die Sowjetunion angrenzenden Völker und Staaten richtete, die einerseits einen *Isolierungsring* um den bolschewistischen Nachbarn, andererseits aber auch die *Flügelstellung* zum deutschen Lebensraum und eine *Flankenstellung* gegenüber den Westmächten, insbesondere Grossbritannien gegenüber, einnahmen. In Berücksichtigung der völlig verschiedenartigen Lebensverhältnisse, der blutmässigen und geistigen Bindungen unter der geschichtlichen Abhängigkeit in den vom Amt beobachteten Bewegungen in diesen Ländern sah es sich daher zur Anwendung der abweichendsten Methoden genötigt um auf diesen oder jenen Wegen zu der gewünschten Einflussnahme zu gelangen.

In *Skandinavien*, in dem nach dem Weltkrieg von 1914/1918 eine immer ausgesprochenere pro-angelsächsische Einstellung, auf wirtschaftlicher Grundlage fussend, vorherrschend wurde, legte das Amt den ganzen Nachdruck auf eine Einwirkung über die allgemein *kulturellen* Beziehungen zu den nordischen Völkern. Zu diesem Zweck nahm es die Nordische Gesellschaft in Lübeck in seine Obhut. Deren Reichstagungen waren von zahlreichen hervorragenden Persönlichkeiten, vor allem auch aus Finnland, beschickt. Während in Schweden und Dänemark eine rein politische Zusammenarbeit sich nicht eröffnete, fand sich in Norwegen dagegen eine auf dem gross-germanischen Gedanken fussende Vereinigung vor, mit deres Gründer eine sehr enge Verbindung hergestellt wurde, die dann auch zu weiteren Folgen führte.

Extracts from a document found in Germany concerning the operations from 1933 to 1943 of the NSDAP's Foreign Affairs Office, whose leader was Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg. The report is signed by Rosenberg himself.

H1158 – 0066

Appendix 2.

b) Weser-Übung

Die Notiz ist völlig unzulänglich und trifft den Inhalt des Vortrages nicht. Ich hatte in den Wochen vor dem Vortrag vom 10.10.39 einen Briefwechsel mit Admiral Carls,der zuerst in einem ausführlichen Brief an mich die Bedeutung einer Besetzung der norwegischen Küste durch Deutschland betonte. Ich gab diesen Brief dem C/Skl zur Kenntnis und fertigte mir an Hand des Briefes einen Sprechzettel* für den Vortrag beim Führer,den ich am 10.10.39 hielt,da meine Auffassung sich mit der des Admirals Carls völlig deckte,während Skl diesem Problem damals noch fern stand. Ich betonte dabei die Nachteile,die eine Besetzung von norwegischen Stützpunkten durch die Engländer für uns haben würde - Beherrschung der Ostseeeingänge,Flankierung unserer Seekriegsoperationen in der Nordsee und der Fliegerangriffe auf England,Druck auf Schweden - sowie die Vorteile des Besitzes der norwegischen Küste für uns - Ausfallpforte wie nach Nordatlantik,keine englische Minenbarre möglich im Jahr 1917/18.- Es war damals naturgemäss nur von der Küste und von Stützpunkten die Rede,wobei ich Narvik mit einbezog,während Admiral Carls im Verlaufe des Briefwechsels auf Narvik glaubte verzichten zu können. (Wir hatten damals noch die Benutzung von Murmansk bezw.eines besonderen russischen Stützpunktes zu unserer Verfügung). Dem Führer leuchtete sofort die Bedeutung des Norwegenproblems ein; er bat mich um Überlassung des Sprechzettels und erklärte,er wolle sich mit der Frage beschäftigen.

Bei der weiteren Entwicklung unterstützte mich Korv.Kapitän Schreiber,Marineattaché in Oslo und der M-Chef persönlich - in Verbindung mit der Organisation Rosenberg - ,sodaß mir Verbindung mit Quisling und Hagelin erhielten,die Anfang Dezember in Berlin eintrafen und von mir -im Einvernehmen mit Reichsleiter Rosenberg,** beim Führer eingeführt wurden. Auf Grund der Besprechung des Führers mit Quisling und Hagelin am 14.12.39 nachmittags gab der Führer den Befehl zur Vorbereitung des Norwegenunternehmens durch OKW.

* Vielleicht ist dieser mit Hilfe von K.Adm.v.Puttkamer noch festzustellen; ich hatte kein Duplikat,da ich an die Abgabe des Zettels nicht gedacht hatte.

** R.hatte im entscheidenden Moment seinen Fuss verletzt,sodaß ich ihn am 14.12.vorm.in seiner Wohnung aufsuchte.

Extracts from a note from Admiral Raeder of 10th January 1940, to Grand Admiral Assmann concerning the "Weser-Übung", i. e. the attack on Norway.

H1158 – 0067

Skl hat bis dahin an dem Weitertreiben der Norwegenfrage keinen Anteil gehabt, stand ihr auch weiterhin etwas skeptisch gegenüber. Die Vorbereitungen, die Kpt.z.S. Krancke im OKW bearbeitete, gründeten sich aber auf eine Denkschrift der Skl.

c) Seelöwe

Ich habe in dieser Frage 1940/41 immer die gleiche Stellung genommen - wie sie in den Protokollen wiederholt niedergelegt ist: Sehr großes Risiko, da England seine ganze Flotte einsetzen wird, gegenüber unseren schwachen Seestreitkräften. Landung daher nur durchführbar, wenn günstigste äussere Verhältnisse (Wetter, Stromverhältnisse usw.) und vor allem deutsche Luftherrschaft. War diese nicht vorhanden, so war die Landung m.E. nicht ausführbar. War sie vorhanden, hielt ich ein Gelingen für möglich und habe dementsprechend auch die Vorbereitungen mit größtem Nachdruck betrieben, die seitens der Marine noch rechtzeitig für die Herbstlandung fertiggestellt wurden. Die Durchführung dieser Vorbereitungen in der kurzen zur Verfügung stehenden Zeit ist ein sehr großes Verdienst aller beteiligten Stellen.

H1158 – 0068

Appendix 3.

Sitzungsprotokell vom 11.XII. 1939. 12 Uhr.

Es erscheinen beim Ob. d. M. Herr H. und Herr Q.

Q. brachte zum Ausdruck, dass seitens England Norwegen gegenüber nicht wie bei den übrigen skandinavischen Staaten die erwünschte Neutralitätserklärung abgegeben worden sei. Nach allen vorhandenen Beobachtungen und Unterlagen habe England auch nicht die Absicht, für die Dauer des Krieges die Neutralität Norwegens zu achten. Erst auf besonderes Drängen seitens Q. im Storting habe die englische Regierung die gewünschte Erklärung abgegeben. Jedoch habe die jetzige norwegische Regierung ein Geheimabkommen mit England abgeschlossen, dass im Kriegsfall Norwegens gegen eine Grossmacht der Einmarsch Englands mit norwegischer Genehmigung erfolgen solle. Die Landung sei in der Nähe von Stavanger vorgesehen und zu einem englischen Stützpunkt würde Christiansand Verwendung finden. Die jetzige norwegische Regierung sowie Storting und die gesamte Aussenpolitik würde beherrscht von dem bekannten Juden Hambrow, der ein besonderer Freund von Hoare Belisha sei. Die Stimmung der norwegischen Bevölkerung sei seit langem bewusst pro-englisch und anti-deutsch betrieben und die gesamte norwegische Presse befinde sich in englischem Besitz. Hambrow missbrauche seine Stellung dazu, Norwegen mit Hilfe zahlreicher englischer Agenten unter englischen Einfluss bezw. völlige Abhängigkeit zu bringen. Der Einfluss der norwegischen Politik macht sich stark fühlbar in den übrigen skandinavischen Ländern (Schweden, Dänemark und Finnland). Diese Staaten seien sich auch darüber im klaren, dass der Besitz Norwegens die Schlüsselstellung für den gesamten Handel innerhalb der Nord- und Ostsee bedeute. Die Gefahren, die Deutschland durch ein englisches Norwegen entständen, wurden erindringlichst geschildert. (Beispiel: Die Ausläufer von Rhein und Elbe sind von den Westmächten flankiert). Die Ostsee entwickle sich zu einem Kriegsschauplatz, in dem Deutschland nicht mehr ungestört Handel führen kann.

Grosse Besorgnis erregt bei allen norwegischen Patrioten das Vordringen Russlands in Finnland. Man erwarte weiteren Druck auf die skandinavischen Länder. Man verstehe, das Deutschland im Augenblick gegen das Russische Vorgehen nichts veranlassen könne, jedoch habe man den Wunsch, zu verhindern, dass Russland einen weiteren Einfluss auf Skandinavien bekomme. Hambrow und seine Anhänger glauben dies mit Hilfe Englands durchführen zu können. Die nationale Partei habe jedoch den Wunsch, es nicht zu den auf Grund eines Fussfassens Englands in Norwegen sich mit Deutschland ergebenden Streitigkeiten kommen zu lassen. Die nationale Partei habe daher den Wunsch, einem evtl. englischen Schritt vorzukommen, in dem man der deutschen Wehrmacht entsprechende Stützpunkte zur Verfügung stelle. In dem gesamten Küstengebiet seien deshalb bereits Männer in wichtigen Stellungen (Eisenbahn, Post, Nachrichtenwesen) für diese Sache gedungen. Unbedingt notwendig sei eine Änderung in der deutschen Haltung der Politik Norwegens gegenüber. Monatelange Fühlungnahme mit Reichsleiter Rosenberg habe nicht zu dem gewünschten Erfolg geführt. (Unfähigkeit der dort akkreditierten Diplomaten). Q. & H. brachten zum Ausdruck, dass ihr jetziger Besuch in Deutschland dem Zwecke diene, klare Verhältnisse in der deutschen Haltung für die Zukunft zu schaffen. Mit Ablauf des 10. Januar sei die jetzige Regierung und Storting ungesetzlich. Es bestände die Möglichkeit einer politischen Umwälzung, bei der die nationale Partei sich evtl. nicht tatenlos verhalten werde. Besprechungen seien erwünscht in Richtung gemeinsamer Aktion, Truppenüberführung nach Oslo pp. Die evtl. Auslage von Schutzsperren. Als Vertrauensmann wird der Amtsleiter Scheidt erbeten.

Ob. d. M. sagt zu, dem Führer entsprechend Vortrag zu halten und Q. und H. von dem Ergebnis dieser Unterredung zu unterrichten.

Protocol of a Meeting on 11th December 1939 in the German Navy Head Quarters. "Herr Q." is Vidkun Quisling, "Herr H." is W. Hagelin, later Minister of the interior in the Quisling Government.

H1158 – 0069

Appendix 4.

13. Dezember 1939

Herrn
Großadmiral Dr. Raeder,
Oberbefehlshaber der Kriegsmarine,

Berlin-Charlottenburg
Ulmenallee 8.

Sehr geehrter Herr Großadmiral Raeder!

Ich habe mit Quisling gestern noch eine eingehende Aussprache gehabt und lege Ihnen kurz noch einige Einzelheiten zwecks Beantwortung jener Fragen nieder, die an mich gestern noch gerichtet wurden.

Ich bin gestern abend in der Dunkelheit leider mit meinem kranken Fuss an eine Tür gestossen und wieder unbeweglich, sonst hätte ich Sie heute gern gesprochen, und an entsprechenden Stellen den Inhalt der gestrigen Unterredung gemeldet.

Es bliebe also zu entscheiden, ob wir Herrn Staatsrat Quisling zu einem Empfang empfehlen oder nicht. Entscheidend ist dabei die Beurteilung der Tatsache, ob die politische Spannung in Skandinavien so beurteilt werden muss, dass wir hier mit einem aggressiven Ausbruch unseres Gegners rechnen müssen mit all den schweren Folgen, die daraus entstehen würden, oder ob wir glauben, die Dinge noch so wie bisher weiter treiben lassen zu können; zweitens die allein unter Ihre Kompetenz fallende Beurteilung der militärtechnischen Möglichkeiten und ferner die Beurteilung einer schlagartigen Durchführung in Skandinavien selber.

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Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg's (unsigned) letter to Admiral Raeder of 13th December 1939.

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Ich lasse Ihnen beiliegend eine Aktennotiz zugehen und wäre Ihnen verbunden, wenn Sie nach Durchsicht bei mir zu Hause, unter der Nummer 89 33 29 anrufen könnten. Falls Sie der Meinung sein sollten, einen Empfang beim Führer zu befürworten und ich mich noch nicht bewegen könnte, würde ich Sie bitten, Quisling vorzustellen.

Mein rein persönlicher Eindruck ist der, dass, wenn man handeln kann, man handeln müsste!

Heil Hitler !
Ihr sehr ergebener

1 Anlage

H1158 – 0071

Appendix 5.

Aktennotiz

Betr.: Besuch des Staatsrats Quisling-Norwegen

In Ergänzung bisheriger Nachrichten teile ich mit, dass Quisling als einer der bekanntesten nordischen Generalstabsoffiziere gilt, Militärattaché in Finnland war, von 1927-30 vor Abbruch der diplomatischen Beziehungen zwischen der Sowjet-Union und Groß-Britannien die Vertretung der Britischen Geschäfte in Moskau innehatte. Von 1931 - 33 war er norwegischer Kriegsminister, als Vertreter der Norwegischen Bauernpartei, trat dann zurück und gründete eine radikale nationale und soziale Partei unter dem Namen "Nationale Sammlung". Diese Partei stand und steht auf einem antisemitischen Standpunkt und vertritt engste Zusammenarbeit mit Deutschland, zählt 15.000 eingeschriebene Mitglieder, und Quisling gibt seine unmittelbare Anhängerschaft mit 2 - 300.000 an, d.h. jene 10%, die inmitten selbst der heutigen klaren antideutschen

-2-

Appendix to Rosenberg's letter concerning a visit by Quisling.

H1158 – 0072

Stimmung in Norwegen und Schweden für eine Zusammenarbeit mit Deutschland eintreten. Seine Partei hat auch an den Wahlen für Storthing nicht teilgenommen.

Der Anlass einer Aktion, die Quisling vortrug, wäre gegeben durch die Tatsache, dass ~~Herr~~ der Storthing gegen die Verfassung seine eigene Verlängerung beschlossen hat, die am 12. Januar in Kraft treten soll. Quisling hat als alter Offizier und ehemaliger Kriegsminister auch jetzt noch engste Beziehungen zur norwegischen Armee. Er zeigte mir das Original eines Briefes, den er erst kürzlich vom Kommandanten in Narvik, Oberst S u n l o, erhalten hatte. In diesem Brief betont Oberst Sunlo offen: unter den jetzigen Umständen, wenn sie so weiter gingen, sei Norwegen erledigt. Er hoffe nur, dass aus der Nation noch soviel übrig bleibe, dass aus den Resten ein Volk geschaffen werden könne, welches Norwegen wieder gut und wahrhaftig aufbauen könne. Das jetzige Geschlecht werde mit Recht in die Wüste geschickt, und man müsste

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H1158 – 0073

sagen, es verdiene nichts anderes; denn wie er es verstehe, hätten die Norweger sich gegen die unveränderlichen Gesetze der Welt vergangen. Dieses Gesetz verlange Arbeit und Idealismus, und niemals sei Dummheit als eine brauchbare Entschuldigung angesehen worden. "Ich werde nichts tun für den Säufer Madsen (Handelsminister), für den Verteidigungsfeind Monsen (Kriegsminister) und für das Rindvieh Nygolswold (Premierminister).Dagegen kann es gut und nützlich sein, seine Zeit damit zu verbringen, einmal seine Knochen für die nationale Erhebung zu riskieren." gez.: Konrad Sunlo.

Amtsleiter Scheidt, der mehrfach in Norwegen gewesen ist und dort eine Anzahl Bekanntschaften besitzt, teilt mit, dass sich in ähnlicher Weise der Kommandant des grössten Truppenübungsplatzes, Høoslev, geäussert habe, ebenso wie der Chef der Kriegsschule in Halden, Kapitän Fritzner.

Den König kennt Quisling aus seiner Amts-

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H1158 – 0074

zeit sehr gut, und er glaubt, dass der König auch ihn schätze, wenn er auch im grossen und ganzen englandfreundlich gesinnt sei. Als grösster Feind Deutschlands und als vielleicht mächtigste politische Persönlichkeit, in deren Händen praktisch die Politik des Nordens augenblicklich liege, wird der Jude H a m b r o bezeichnet, der Präsident des Storthing, der zugleich der Präsident des Auswärtigen Ausschusses.ist. Zugleich ist er Führer der Delegation beim Völkerbund und Führer der stärksten politischen Partei, der sogenannten "Konservativen", in deren Hand das Schicksal der augenblicklichen Minderheitsregierung liegt. Hambro kontrolliert auch das Nachrichtenwesen in Norwegen, und so steht zu befürchten - und zwar in Kürze zu befürchten -, dass angesichts der durch den russisch-finnischen Konflikt wachsenden anti-russischen Stimmung für England erhöhte Kräfte ~~und~~ gegen Deutschland immer schneller an Macht gewinnen.

H1158 – 0075

Über die Möglichkeit einer Aktion ist dahingehend ein Plan vorgetragen worden, wonach eine Anzahl ausgesuchter Norweger möglichst schnell in Deutschland für eine entsprechende Tat nebst genauer Arbeitsteilung ausgebildet werden sollen, ihr beigegeben erfahrene nationalsozialistische Kämpfer, die Übungen in derartigen Aktionen besitzen. Diese Ausgebildeten müssten dann möglichst schnell nach Norwegen, wobei über die Einzelheiten noch zu reden wäre. Die Besetzung einiger wichtiger Zentralen in Oslo müsste schlagartig erfolgen, und zu gleicher Zeit müsste die deutsche Flotte nebst entsprechenden Kontingenten der deutschen Armee an einer vorgesehenen Bucht vor der Einfahrt von Oslo auf besonderen Ruf der neuen norwegischen Regierung eingesetzt werden. Quisling zweifelt nicht, dass eine solche Tat - im Augenblick gelungen - ihm sofort die Zustimmung jener Teile der Armee bringen wird, mit denen er jetzt Verbindungen hat, wobei es sich von selbst

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H1158 – 0076

versteht, dass er über einen politischen Kampf nie mit ihnen gesprochen hat. Vom König glaubt er, dass er einer solchen vollzogenen Tatsache Rechnung tragen würde.

Die Zahl der notwendigen deutschen Truppen beziffert Quisling in Übereinstimmung mit den deutschen Ausrechnungen.

gez.: A.Rosenberg

F.d.R.
H. Büdar

H1158 – 0077

Appendix 6.

58.

Vortrag Ob.d.M. beim Führer 12.XII.39, 12 Uhr mittags.
(Anwesend: Gen.Ob.Keitel, Gen.Maj.Jodel, Korv.K.v.Puttkamer)

Betrifft: Angelegenheit Norwegen.

Ob.d.M. hat die beiden Herren Q und H empfangen. Q., früher Kriegsminister, Führer der nationalen Partei, macht zuverlüssigen Eindruck, berichtet: Stimmung in N. sehr stark gegen Deutschland eingestellt, infolge Konfliktes Finnland - Rußland in noch höherem Maße als bisher. Einfluß Englands sehr groß, vor allem durch Storthing-Präsident Hambro (Jude und Freund von Hore Belisha.), der in N. z.Zeit allmächtig. Abmachung zwischen England und N. betreffs ev. Besetzung N's besteht nach Q's Überzeugung. Dann würde auch Schweden sich gegen Deutschland stellen. Gefahr der Besetzung N's durch England sehr drohend: in Kürze möglich. Vom 11.I.40 an ist Storthing und damit Regierung N's illegal, da der Storthing seine Verlängerung um 1 Jahr selbst beschlossen hat gegen die Verfassung. Dies würde eine Gelegenheit zu einer politischen Umwälzung geben können. Q. hat gute Beziehungen zu Offizieren des n. Heeres und hat Anhänger in wichtigen Plätzen und in wichtigen Stellungen (z.B. Eisenbahn). Q. ist bereit, in solchem Falle die Regierung zu übernehmen und Deutschland zu Hilfe zu rufen. Q. ist ferner bereit, Vorbereitungen militärischer Art mit der deutschen Wehrmacht zu besprechen.

Ob.d.M. weist darauf hin, daß man bei solchen Angeboten nie wissen kann, wieweit die betreffenden Personen die eigenen Parteiabsichten fördern wollten u. wieweit ihnen die deutschen Interessen am Herzen lägen. Daher Vorsicht geboten.--- Es müsse ausgeschlossen sein, daß N. in die Hände E's falle, das kriegsentscheidend sein; denn dann sei auch Schweden

- 2 -

Memorandum by Admiral Raeder to the "Führer" concerning, "the Norway Affair".

H1158 – 0078

59.

Schweden völlig unter dem Einfluß E's, und es werde wohl der Krieg in die Ostsee getragen werden, was aber die deutsche Marine in der Ozean-und Nordseekriegführung völlig behindert werden würde. Auch der Führer bezeichnete die Inbesitznahme N-s durch E. als untragbar. Ob.d.M. wies darauf hin, daß Besetzung von Stützpunkten an der Küste von N. durch D. naturgemäß starke engl. Gegenwirkung hervorrufen würde, um den Erztransport von Narwik zu unterbinden, und daß dadurch starke Überwasserkriegführung an der norweg. Küste bewirkt würde, der die deutsche Marine auf die Dauer noch nicht gewachsen wäre. Dies sei ein Schwächepunkt der Besetzung.

Der Führer erwog, Q. persönlich zu sprechen, um Eindruck von ihm zu gewinnen; er wolle Reichsleiter Rosenberg vorher noch einmal hören, da dieser Q. seit längerer Zeit kennt.

Ob.d.M. schlägt vor: falls Führer günstigen Eindruck erhalte, sollte OKW Erlaubnis bekommen, mit Q. Pläne zur Vorbereitung und Durchführung der Besetzung

a) auf friedlichem Wege -- d.h. deutsche Wehrmacht von N. gerufen -- oder

b) auf gewaltsame Weise zu vereinbaren.

Hier ist [illegible]

2.) Ob.d.M. befürwortet [illegible] klare Linie im Rußland - Finnland - Konflikt einzuhalten: Keine Unterstützung Finnlands durch Waffen (auf dem Wege über das unzuverlässige Schweden).

Chef OKW erklärt, es sei A.A. für Schweden mitgeteilt, daß Waffen an Schweden nur geliefert würden, falls die Regierung schriftlich bescheinige, daß sie nur für die schwedische Wehr-

- 3 -

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60.

Wehrmacht verwendet würden.

Ob.d.M. befürwortet auf der anderen Seite Entgegenkommen gegenüber Rußland, z.B. bei Ölversorgung der U-Boote, da Rußland uns praktisch auch Vorteile böte, z.B. Festhalten fremder Dampfer in Murmansk bis 3 Tage nach Abfahrt Bremen."

Führer ist mit beiden Punkten einverstanden.

Raeder

Appendix 7.

Der Chef
des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht
Nr. 22045/40 g. K. Chefs. WFA/Abt. L.

Berlin, den 23. 1. 40
5 Ausfertigungen.
2 Ausfertigung

Betr. Studio «N».
Bes. 22039/40 g. K. Chefs. WFA/Abt. L (I) v. 23. 1. 40.

Der Führer und Oberste Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht wünscht, dass die Studio «N» unter seinem persönlichen und unmittelbarem Einfluss und im engsten Zusammenhang mit der Gesamtkriegführung weiter bearbeitet wird. Aus diesen Gründen hat der Führer mich beauftragt, die Leitung der weiteren Verarbeiten su übernehmen.

Hierzu wird im OKW ein Arbeitsstab gebildet, der gleichseitig der kern des künftigen Operationsstabes darstellt.

Die Oberkommandos der Wehrmachtteile bitte ich, je einen als I a geeigneten Offizier für diesen Stab zu bennen, der möglichst auch in Organisations und Nachschubfragen geschult ist. Amt Ausl./Abw. stellt den Io, WFA den Transportbearbeiter, 1 Offz. für Nachrichtenverbindungen und 1 Offz. für allgemeine Fragen der Landesverwaltung.

Zeitpunkt des Zusammentritts wird noch mitgeteilt.

Die gesamte weitere Bearbeitung erfolgt unter dem Stichwort «Weserübung».

(Signed) — *Keitel.*

General Keitel's order about "Studio N".

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Appendix 8.

The War in Norway in 1940: The Centre of Elverum after the bombing of 11th April 1940.

Appendix 9.

The War in Norway in 1940: Kristiansund N. after the "Luftwaffe" s attack.

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Appendix 10.



The War in Norway in 1940: The church in Molde set on fire by German bombs.

Appendix 11.

The War in Norway in 1940: Molde after the German bombing.

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Appendix 12.

The War in Norway in 1940: Namsos after the German bombing.

Appendix 13.

The War in Norway in 1940: Steinkjer after the German bombing.

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Appendix 14.

The War in Norway in 1940: The town of Bodø set on fire by German explosive and incendiary bombs.

Appendix 15.

The War in Norway in 1940: Bodø after the German attack.

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Appendix 16.

Erlass des Führers über Ausübung der Regierungsbefugnisse in Norwegen.

Vom 24. April 1940.

Um die öffentliche Ordnung und das öffentliche Leben in den unter dem Schutze der deutschen Truppen stehenden norwegischen Gebieten sicher zu stellen, ordne ich an:

§ 1.

Die besetzten norwegischen Gebiete werden dem «Reichskommissar für die besetzten norwegischen Gebiete» unterstellt. Sein Sitz ist Oslo. Der Reichskommissar ist Wahrer der Reichsinteressen und übt im zivilen Bereich die oberste Regierungsgewalt aus.

§ 2.

Der Reichskommissar kann sich zur Durchführung seiner Anordnungen und zur Ausübung der Verwaltung des norwegischen Verwaltungsausschusses und der norwegischen Behörden bedienen.

§ 3.

Das bisher geltende Recht bleibt in Kraft, soweit es mit der Besetzung vereinbar ist.

Der Reichskommissar kann durch Verordnung Recht setzen. Die Verordnungen werden im «Verordnungsblatt für die besetzten norwegischen Gebiete» verkündet.

§ 4.

Der Befehlshaber der deutschen Truppen in Norwegen übt die militärischen Hoheitsrechte aus, seine Forderungen werden im zivilen Bereich allein vom Reichskommissar durchgesetzt. Soweit und solange es die militärische Lage erfordert, hat er das Recht, die Massnahmen anzuordnen, die zur Durchführung seines militärischen Auftrages und zur militärischen Sicherung Norwegens notwendig sind.

§ 5.

Zur Durchsetzung seiner Anordnungen kann sich der Reichskommissar deutscher Polizeiorgane bedienen. Die deutschen Polizeiorgane stehen dem Befehlshaber der deutschen Truppen in Norwegen zur Verfügung, soweit es die militärichen Bedürfnisse erfordern und die Aufgaben des Reichskommissars es zulassen.

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§ 6.

Der Reichskommissar untersteht mir unmittelbar und erhält von mir Richtlinien und Weisungen.

§ 7.

Zum Reichskommissar für die besetzten norwegischen Gebiete bestelle ich den Oberpräsidenten Terboven.

§ 8.

Vorschriften zur Durchführung und Ergänzung dieses Erlasses ergehen nach meinen Richtlinien für den zivilen Bereich durch den Reichsminister und Chef der Reichskanzlei, für den militärischen Bereich durch den Chef des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht.

Der Führer
Adolf Hitler.

Der Reichsminister und Chef der Reichskanzlei
Dr. Lammers.

Der Chef des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht
Keitel.

Der Reichsminister des Innern
Frick.



The Organisation of the German Civil Administration in Norway.

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Höhere SS- u. Polizei-Führer.



The Organisation of the German «Sicherheitspolizei» in Norway.

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Appendix 19.

Extracts from Speech by Reichskommissar Terboven.

September 25, 1940.

. . . The German people has not in the past, neither does it to-day, entertain any hostile feelings towards the Norwegian people. On the contrary, it feels itself bound by ties of kinship with it as a member of the great Nordic family of races, and attaches importance to living and working with it in friendship and mutual esteem—a declaration of friendship, however, the value of which can only be made a reality on condition that it is not on one side only. . . .

I now come to the consequences which must be drawn from this situation, and to the measures which it was necessary to take:

1. The Royal House—especially as it has been repudiated even by a two-thirds majority of the Storting—has no further political importance and will not return to Norway.
2. The same applies to the Nygaardsvold Government, which has also fled the country.
3. In consequence, any activity in accordance with the policy or in favour of the Royal House or the fugitive Government is of course prohibited.
4. The activity of the Administrative Council is terminated.
5. In accordance with the right conferred upon me by the decree of the *Führer* of April 24, I have appointed the following State Councillors, who have taken over the conduct of Government business as from to-day:

Trade, Handicrafts, Industry, and Fisheries: Commercial Councillor Sigurd Halvorsen-Johanessen; Shipping: Captain Kjeld Irgens; Public Worship and Education: Professor Ragnar Skancke; Internal Affairs: Director William Hagelin; Social Affairs: Professor Birger Meidell; Supply: Director Øystein Ravner; Police: Jonas Lie; Justice: State Advocate Sverre Riisnæs; Agriculture: Thorstein Jon Onstad Fretheim, veterinary surgeon; Finance: Bank Director Erling Sandberg; National Instruction and Culture: Director Dr. Gudbrand Lunde; Physical Training: Axel Stang; Public Works, Tormod Hustad, architect.

6. The old political parties are dissolved as from to-day. The necessary details will be made public later.
7. New formations for the purpose of political activity of any sort will not be allowed.

. . The political development of the last years has shown beyond doubt the correctness of the political views of *Nasjonal Samling* and its leader Vidkun Quisling. The Norwegian people would have been spared much pain and distress if it had adhered to these views. I, and the German people too, have been and still am ready to co-operate with all my strength in the reconstruction of Norwegian economic life. I am convinced that a great future lies before Norway within the framework of the new European order which is coming into being. Henceforward there is only one road to a solution calculated to give the Norwegian people freedom and independence. It leads through *Nasjonal Samling*.

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Appendix 20.

Verordnung über das Verbot der Betätigung zugunsten des norwegischen Königshauses.

Vom 7. Oktober 1940.

Auf Grund des § 3 Abs. 2 des Erlasses des Führers über Ausübung der Regierungsbefugnisse in Norwegen vom 24. April 1940 wird folgendes verordnet:

§ 1.

Jedwede Propaganda zugunsten des norwegischen Königshauses oder eines seiner Mitglieder ist verboten.

§ 2.

(1) Wer es unternimmt, zugunsten des norwegischen Königshauses oder eines seiner Mitglieder in Wort, Bild oder Schrift oder in sonstiger Weise zu werben, wird mit Zuchthaus bis zu 3 Jahren oder mit Gefängnis bestraft; daneben kann auf eine Geldstrafe erkannt werden.

(2) Zur Aburteilung werden Sondergerichte bestellt.

§ 3.

Die Verordnung tritt mit dem Tage der Verkündung in Kraft.

Oslo, den 7. Oktober 1940.

Der Reichskommissar für die besetzten norwegischen Gebiete
Terboven

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Appendix 21.

Verordnung über das Verbot der politischen Parteien in Norwegen.

Vom 25. September 1940.

Auf Grund des § 3 Abs. 2 des Erlasses des Führers über Ausübung der Regierungsbefugnisse in Norwegen vom 24. April 1940 wird folgendes verordnet:

§ 1.

(1) Die politischen Parteien und anderen politischen Organisationen in Norwegen werden aufgelöst. Die Auflösung erstreckt sich auch auf die Nebenorganisationen, die angeschlossenen Verbände und Vereinigungen.

(2) Ausgenommen ist Nasjonal Samling mit ihren Unterorganisationen.

§ 2.

Zweifelfragen darüber, welche Organisationen als politische anzusehen sind, entscheidet der Reichskommissar allgemein rechtverbindlich.

§ 3.

Zur Liquidation des Vermögens der gemäss § 1 aufgelösten Organisationen werden vom Reichskommissar Treuhänder bestellt.

§ 4.

(1) Wer es unternimmt, den organisatorischen Zusammenhalt einer der gemäss § 1 aufgelösten Organisationen aufrecht zu erhalten oder eine Ersatzorganisation oder eine neue politische Organisation zu bilden, wird mit Zuchthaus bis zu 3 Jahren oder mit Gefängnis bestraft; daneben kann auf eine Geldstrafe erkannt werden. Ebenso wird bestraft, wer sich im Sinne der aufgelösten Organisationen weiter betätigt.

(2) Zur Aburteilung werden Sondergerichte bestellt; die Ausführungsbestimmungen hierzu erlässt der Reichskommissar.

§ 5.

Die Verordnung tritt mit dem Tage der Verkündung in Kraft.

Oslo, den 25. September 1940.

Der Reichskommissar für die besetzten norwegische Gebiete
Terboven

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Appendix 22.

Verordnung über die Entlassung und Versetzung von Beamten.

Vom 4. Oktober 1940.

Um den kommissarischen Staatsräten die Durchführung der politischen Neuordnung zu erleichtern, wird auf Grund des § 3 Abs. 2 des Erlasses des Führers über Ausübung der Regierungsbefugnisse in Norwegen vom 24. April 1940 folgendes verordnet:

§ 1.

(1) Beamte, die nach ihrer politischen Haltung nicht die Gewähr dafür bieten, dass sie mit ganzer Kraft an der politischen Neuordnung mitwirken, können aus dem Dienst entlassen werden.

(2) Entlassungen gemäss Abs. 1 können nur innerhalb von 6 Monaten nach Inkrafttreten dieser Verordnung ausgesprochen werden.

§ 2.

(1) Beamte können, wenn es zur Durchführung der politischen Neuordnung im Interesse des Dienstes erforderlich ist, in ein anderes Amt oder an einen anderen Ort versetzt werden. In diesen Fällen soll die Stelle, in die der Beamte versetzt wird, nach ihrer Art und nach dem Diensteinkommen, dass mit der Stelle verbunden ist, der bisherigen Stelle des Beamten entsprechen.

(2) Unter den in Abs. 1 Satz 1 genannten Voraussetzungen können Beamte auch in den Wartestand versetzt werden.

(3) Versetzungen nach Abs. 1 und Versetzungen in den Wartestand nach Abs. 2 können nur innerhalb von 6 Monaten nach Inkrafttreten dieser Verordnung vorgenommen werden.

§ 3.

(1) Massnahmen nach den §§ 1 und 2 werden durch den zuständigen kommissarischen Staatsrat getroffen. Zuständig ist derjenige kommissarische Staatsrat, dessen Geschäftsbereich der betroffene Beamte verwaltungsmässig angehört; der kommissarische Staatsrat für das Finanzwesen ist in jedem Fall zu beteiligen.

(2) Die Entlassung nach § 1 wird wirksam mit der Zustellung einer Entlassungsurkunde an den betroffenen Beamten. Massnahmen nach § 2 werden wirksam mit der Zustellung eines entsprechenden Bescheids an den betroffenen Beamten.

§ 4.

Die Vorschriften dieser Verordnung gelten für Beamte aller Gattungen.

§ 5.

Massnahmen, die auf Grund dieser Verordnung getroffen werden, unterliegen nicht der Nachprüfung durch die Gerichte.

§ 6.

(1) Die Bezüge der entlassenen Beamten werden durch den kommissarischen Staatsrat für das Finanzwesen im Verordnungswege geregelt.

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(2) Der kommissarische Staatsrat für das Finanzwesen erlässt auch die sonst noch erforderlichen Durchführungsvorschriften.

§ 7.

Diese Verordnung tritt mit dem Tage der Verkündung in Kraft.

Oslo, den 4. Oktober 1940.

Der Reichskommissar für die besetzten norwegischen Gebiete
Terboven

Appendix 23.

The Minister President's Proclamation relating to the National Government.

In conformity with the State Act at Akershus Castle on February 1st, 1942, it is proclaimed:

Section 1. The Minister President is the head of the Government. The Minister President possesses the authority which, according to the Constitution, was vested in the King and the Storting.

Section 2. The Minister President will appoint, in case of absence, a substitute in each separate case, if he finds it necessary.

Section 3. The Minister President's decrees are to be jointly signed by the Minister concerned and countersigned by the head of the Ministerial Secretariat.

Laws inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution shall, in addition, be countersigned by the Minister of Justice, and a statement shall be included in an introduction to the effect that the law is valid regardless of the provisions of the Constitution.

Section 4. The Ministers may, each within his own province, pursuant to authority from the Minister President, enact regulations having the force of law to amplify and execute laws promulgated by the Minister President. Such regulations are to be issued as decrees and signed by the Minister concerned. This also applies to instructions of a legislative nature issued by a Minister pursuant to authority of laws or decrees in force.

Section 5. The Minister President's laws and the Ministers' decrees are to be published in "Norsk Lovtidend" (Norwegian Legal Gazette). In the absence of provision to the contrary, they become effective from the day following their promulgation.

Section 6. The Minister will make the administrative decisions dealt with in Article 28 of the Constitution as well as those which, according to the Constitution, were vested in the Storting. Other administrative questions are to be decided by the Minister concerned.

Decision of the Minister President pursuant to sentence of the foregoing paragraph will be countersigned by the Minister concerned.

Section 7. Matters which pursuant to this proclamation are to be decided by the Minister President will in general be dealt with by the Ministers in Council.

Oslo, February 5th, 1942.

Vidkun Quisling.

H1158 – 0093

Appendix 24.

This picture shows how the Norwegian patriots who were executed by the Germans had their hands tied to their back before the execution.

Appendix 25.

This pictures shows another murdered Norwegian patriot.

H1158 – 0094

Appendix 26.



This young Norwegian patriot was executed by the Germans without trial. The tweezers through his head show the way of the bullet.

Appendix 27.

This man was executed by a shot through the neck.

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Appendix 28.

After the execution the corpses were thrown in a grave, which the prisoners perhaps had dug themselves. The upper corpse is of a woman also murdered by a «neckshot».

Appendix 29.

This young Norwegian patriot was tortured to death by the Germans. Before he was cremated, a member of the Resistance Movement succeeded in taking this picture.

Appendix 30.

Here is another case of a Norwegian patriot tortured to death by the Germans.

H1158 – 0096

Appendix 31.

To the Population:

The evacuation of a part of North Norway has been rendered a military necessity as a result of the treachery of a Finnish Government clique.

This evacuation necessitates the removal of the civilian population, as the enemy has proved that, in those territories occupied by him, he ruthlessly and brutally forces the civilian population to give him active assistance in achieving his aims.

This means that no shelter or means of existence of any kind can be left to the Bolshevik enemy in the fighting zone. All such installations as housing accommodation, transport facilities and food stocks must be destroyed or removed.

The population in these districts will therefore be deprived of the basis for their existence so that in order to be able to survive they must evacuate to those Norwegian territories which are still protected by the German wehrmacht.

For this reason, the German occupation authorities have declared themselves prepared to support, by all means at their disposal, the civil evacuation which the Norwegian authorities are carrying out.

In the interests of the people themselves all means by which they can effect their own evacuation are to be used to the greatest possible extent.

It is above all essential for a successful evacuation that all fishing smacks and other craft which are available in this area shall be fully employed. Owners of craft who try to evade evacuation must be prepared for severe counter-measures such as the shooting and sinking of craft and crew.

He who does not comply with these unequivocal instructions exposes himself and his family to possible death in the arctic winter without house or food.

(signed) *Terboven.*
Reichskommissar for the
Occupied Norwegian Territories.

(signed) *Rendulic.*
Colonel-General
Commander-in-Chief 20th Army.

Proclamation by Terboven and General Rendulic on the evacuation of Finnmark.

H1158 – 0097

Appendix 32.



The ruins of the townships and fishing villages of Northern Norway stand to-day as monuments of German vandalism. The picture shows the damage in Vadsø.

H1158 – 0098

Appendix 33.

Stab Ia
Nr.1033/40 g

den 18.4.40

Der Führer hat befohlen:

1. Die wirtschaftliche und rüstungswirtschaftliche Ausnutzung des Landes Dänemark kann in freundschaftlichster Weise beginnen, d.h. es können Aufträge nach Dänemark auf dem Verhandlungswege mit den in Betracht kommenden dänischen Firmen gelegt werden.

2. Die Ausnutzung der Wirtschaft des Landes Norwegen kann beginnen. Norwegen ist hierbei als Feindesland zu betrachten.

Verteiler:
Fl, Rü, Po

Hitler's order for the exploitation of Norway as an "Enemy State".

H1158 – 0099

Appendix 34.

Abschrift.

Der Reichskommissar für die besetzten norwegischen Gebiete,
Abteilung Forst und Holzwirtschaft und Jagdwesen.

Tgb. Nr. II F. 10. 453/44. Oslo, den 29. Märtz 1944.

Herrn Forstmeister Prückner,
Feldpostnummer 38 983.

Wie ich bereits wiederholt und eindeutig festgestellt habe, ist für das Mass der Abnutzung der norwegischen Wälder allein die Höhe des kriegswichtigen Bedarfs massgebend. Die Aufbringung des für die Kriegsführung notwendigen Holzes darf durch forstwirtschaftliche Gesichtspunkte keinesfalls beeinträchtigt werden. Fragen der Nachhaltigkeit, der Waldpflege, ja der Erhaltung des Waldes überhaupt spielen in der heutigen Zeit keine Rolle mehr. Selbst wenn Eingriffe zu einem dauernden Verlust an Waldboden mit allen Nachteilen für die Landeskultur und norwegische Wirtschaft führen, sind sie trotzdem vorzunehmen, wenn ohnedies der Bedarf nicht gedeckt werden kann. Ich bitte Sie sich diesen Standpunkt vollinhaltlich zu eigen zu machen und nicht nur gegenüber der norwegischen Seite zu vertreten und durchzusetzen, sondern ihn auch gegenüber den Bedarfs-trägern — insbesondere der Wehrmacht und der OT. — eindeutig zum Ausdrück zu bringen.

Ich bitte Sie daher, jede passende Gelegenheit zu benutzen, um hierüber völlige Klarheit zu schaffen. Die Bedarfsdeckung ist in Norwegen kein forstliches Problem, ihr Ausmass ist lediglich von den von handenen Arbeitskräften und Transportmitteln abhängig. Ich mache Sie ausdrücklich dafür verantwortlich, dass jeder irgendwie verfügbare Stamm in den norwegischen Wäldern der Deckung des deutschen Kriegsbedarfs zugeführt wird.

gez. *Stalmann* (sign.)

Für die Richtigkeit der Abschrift:
O. U. den 3. 5. 1944.
Prückner (sign.)
Forstmeister.

Letter from the "Reichskommissariat" concerning the use of Norwegian forests for the German war effort.

H1158 – 0100

Appendix 35.

Norwegian Reparation Claims.

Total period April 9th, 1940—May 8th, 1945.
Actual values. (i. e. in Norwegian kroner.)

		Total amount	Paid by Germans	Net amount claimed
		Mill. kr.	Mill. kr.	Mill. kr.
I.	Damage to and loss of property other than military equipment and installations (in the strict sense of the terms) in the course of hostilities against Germany, including damage and loss resulting from scorched earth policies insofar as they are not included in the figures given under paragraph IV below:			
	1. Industry and commerce (including mining and power), structures, installations, equipment, stocks of raw materials and goods and goods in process	440	7	433
	2. Ocean shipping and coastwise shipping	1 733	—	1 733
	3. Harbour and port works and installation	74	1	73
	4. Railway and inland water transport, civil aeronautics and automotive transport: structures, installations, equipment	947	490	457
	5. Roads and highways including bridges.....	199	67	132
	6. Agriculture: productive structures, equipment, livestock, grain stocks, damage to arable lands and forests	242	46	196
	7. Public institutions and municipal enterprises	303	33	270
	8. Household articles and personal effects	239	—	239
	9. Gold, silver, coins and bars, national bank notes, foreign currency, securities, jewelry and valuable works of art or works of historical, scientific, educational and religious interest.....	—	—	—
	10. Houses and buildings not otherwise included	266	—	266
	11. Other material damage and loss not included in the foregoing categories	130	23	107
	12. Diverse requisitions not included in the foregoing categories	1 566	1 154	412
II.	Budgetary expenditures allocable to the war exclusive of those reported in I, IV or V	1 043	—	1 043
III.	1. Man-years allocable to the war effort against Germany	226	—	226
	2. Man-years lost to the national economy by the deportation of labour to Germany and forced labour at the order of Germany on national territory, loss of life or health and injuries sustained by civil and military victims of the war and occupation	3 122	—	3 122

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	Total amount	Paid by Germans	Net amount claimed
	Mill. kr.	Mill. kr.	Mill. kr.
IV. Costs of German occupation (exclusive of items reported in I or II above or V below):			
1. Forced payments and extensions of credit to the German agencies such as:			
a. The Reichskreditkassen	11 054	—	11 054
b. The Deutsche Verrechnungskasse	85	—	85
2. Other costs	912	—	912
V. All other claims of a Governmental or private nature against Germany arising out of or during the war with Germany	326	—	326
VI. Other statistical data	—	—	—
Grand total	22 907	1 821	21 086

The Royal Norwegian Government's Reparation Claims against Germany.

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL

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Alfred Jodl

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